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Abstract 
Many platforms have gained their way into consumers daily lives by shifting values and expecta-
tions, increasing ability to self-express oneself, satisfying new needs while expanding markets and 
creating new industries. This is what platform revolution means, yet the strategies and logic behind 
platforms remain much unknown.  
The current literature identifies as the key strategic variables for platforms to be user acquisition, 
standalone value, credibility, profitability, design and openness. However, these discussions don’t 
give clear guidance on how to implement or prioritize these variables according different platform 
types. While the current understanding of strategic differences and how to combine tactics and var-
iables towards each platform type is forming, so is classifying and separating platform types from 
each other. While the two papers have classified platform types their conclusions differed staying 
unconfirmed. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine platform businesses strategies 
and to create a theoretical framework reflecting it while answering to the research question: what 
strategies platforms apply as they go in business and how they attempt to grow? 
The empirical part of this study is aimed at developing a theoretical framework representing the 
strategic decisions made by platforms. It was conducted as an in-depth multi case study by inter-
viewing 14 platform as well as testing 70 platforms’ user experience. Based on these two data sets a 
theoretical framework was formed that is applicable within the Western world. 
Consequently, the theoretical framework representing the key finding of this thesis separates 12 
unique platform strategies for launching a platform business across three platform types identified 
as an e-marketplace, software as a service and social networking sites. Thus, stating that there are 
at least 12 unique platform strategies that organizations follow. The framework guides what kind of 
MVP, key target group and social factors each 12 platform strategy types can utilize and the bound-
aries each type has. It also gives descriptions on all 12 platform strategies and minimum example of 
four businesses that follow that strategy. Furthermore, the thesis discusses multiple vertical and 
horizontal expansion strategies that each platform strategy type can apply when attracting further 
growth towards itself and the factors that need to be considered simultaneously.  
The contributions done towards platform strategies, SaaS and SNS by the framework are ground-
breaking and significant as they create new unique knowledge while invalidating and correcting two 
past attempts to classify and group platforms. However, this thesis contributes also to the concep-
tual understanding of the platform types, how different variables are interlinked to one another and 
to the framework. It also specifies the current understanding of e-marketplace platform strategies.   
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Tiivistelmä 
Alustatalous on muuttanut yhteiskuntaa viime vuosina niin paljon, että on alettu jo puhumaan alus-
tatalouden vallankumouksesta. Alustatoimijat ovat nousseet kuluttajien suureen suosioon samalla 
kun ne ovat laajentaneet markkinoita ja luoneet kokonaan uusia toimialoja. Tätä alustatalouden 
vallankumouksella tarkoitetaan. Alustatalouden toimijoiden strategiat ja toimintalogiikat ovat kui-
tenkin edelleen varsin tuntemattomia. Tämä tutkielma keskittyy niiden valaisemiseen. 
Tämän hetkinen tutkimuskirjallisuus tunnistaa alustatoimijoiden strategisiksi toiminnoiksi käyt-
täjien hankinnan, itsenäisen arvonluonnin, luotettavuuden, kannattavuuden, designin ja avoi-
muuden. Kirjallisuus ei kuitenkaan anna selkeitä ohjeita siitä kuinka kyseiset toiminnot tulisi to-
teuttaa tai priorisoida eri alustatyypeillä. Myös alustatyyppejä koskeva luokittelu ja erottelu on vasta 
aluillaan. Vaikka kaksi aiempaa tutkimusta ovat luokitelleet alustatyyppejä, niiden johtopäätökset 
eroavat toisistaan eikä kummankaan tuloksia ole jatkotutkimuksin vahvistettu. Näidenkin syiden 
vuoksi tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on kuvata alustatalouden toimijoiden strategioita sekä 
luoda sitä heijastava teoreettinen viitekehys. Tämä tutkielma pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen mitä 
strategioita alustat käyttävät liiketoiminnan aloitusvaiheessa sekä kasvupyrkimyksissään? 
Tämän tutkimuksen empiirisen osion tavoitteena on luoda teoreettinen viitekehys, joka mallintaa 
alustatalouden toimijoiden tekemiä strategisia päätöksiä. Viitekehys luotiin monitapaustutkimuk-
sen tuloksena haastatellen 14:ta alustatalouden edustajaa sekä testaten 70 eri alustaa.  
Tämän tutkielman keskeisintä havaintoa edustava teoreettinen viitekehys tunnistaa ja erottelee 12 
ainutlaatuista alustastrategiaa alustaliiketoiminnan käynnistämiseksi kolmella alustatyypillä, jotka 
on määritelty digitaaliseksi markkinapaikaksi, ohjelmistoksi palveluna ja sosiaalisen median si-
vustoiksi. Viitekehyksen avulla organisaatiot voivat hahmottaa omasta strategiastaan tuotetun lisä-
arvon ja tärkeimmän kohderyhmän sekä ymmärtää miten sosiaaliset tekijät vaikuttavat heidän va-
litsemaansa alustastrategiaan. Lisäksi viitekehys avaa alustatyypin keskeisiä rajoitteita sekä mah-
dollisuuksia. Viitekehys antaa myös kuvaukset kaikista 12 alustastrategiasta ja esimerkit vähintään 
neljästä strategiaa seuraavasta yrityksestä. Lisäksi tutkielmassa käsitellään useita vertikaalisia ja 
horisontaalisia laajentumisstrategioita, joita toimijat voivat soveltaa lisäkasvun tavoittelussa.  
   Tutkielma tuo lisäarvoa etenkin alustastrategioiden, ohjelmisto palveluna ja sosiaalisen median 
sivustojen saralla ollen uraauurtavaa ja merkittävää, sillä tutkielmassa luodaan uutta ja ainutlaa-
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kitella ja ryhmitellä alustoja. Tutkielma tarkentaa myös nykyistä tieteellistä ymmärrystä digitaalisen 
markkinapaikan alustastrategioista. Tämä tutkielma edistää myös alustatyyppien käsitteiden ja 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This section sets the context of the platform business phenomenon and highlights its contemporary 
importance of our time as well as formulates both research questions and the main objectives of this 
thesis. 
1.1 Platform revolution and changing market environment  
Platform revolution, a fourth industrial revolution, is currently happening. What it means is that 
world around us has yet again changed. The factors and realities we have relied upon during the 
third industrial revolution, the digital revolution isn’t necessarily accurate anymore and we need to 
find new ways to explain our time and to model it. (Schwab, 2017; World Economic Forum, n.d.; 
Pulkka, 2017a) One of the indicators to this development is converging industries (Berman, 2012; 
Hacklin, Battistini, & Von Krogh, 2013; Schwab, 2017) that highlight some of the logic behind the 
market expansion and shift in consumer preferences that we have experienced as platforms have 
gained their way into consumers daily lives. This, logic is shortly described in figure 1.  
Figure 1, Factors influencing and being influenced by changing environment 
 
Own creation based on (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1998; Pennings & Puranam, 2001; Curran, 
Bröring & Leker, 2010; Lamberti & Lettieri, 2011; Berman, 2012; Hacklin, Battistini, & Von 
Krogh, 2013; Schwab, 2017). 
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When converging industry logic is applied to platform businesses, it can be noted that all of the 
three phases have and increasingly are being covered within various industries. One of the 
indicators is cross disciplinary papers, that have appeared on platforms covering technical, business, 
behavioral, psychological, educational and legal perspectives. Admittingly, the terminology still 
varies among the publications and hasn’t quite settled.  
Although, many incumbents think platforms as market disrupters as they challenge the status quo, 
in many cases platforms have in fact expanded the market. As platforms have been able to innovate, 
produce and scale value more efficiently than traditional companies, they have been able to offer 
goods at lower cost leading to many socio-demographic changes. To mention few, Uber and Lift 
have enabled cheaper taxi services. AirBnB and CouchSurfing have offered cheap alternatives for 
hotels and B&Bs. Skype, WhatsApp, Facebook and Snapchat have made staying in touch with your 
friends and family very affordable and convenient. Crowdfunding options have enabled innovators 
and startups to develop businesses that might not have succeeded via conventional funding. As a 
result of these affordable new goods, consumers are consuming more. Simultaneously consumers’ 
expectations of future offerings have been influenced as new norms have been established.  
The strongest indicator of converging industries is however the natural desire and the very business 
logic that many platforms rely upon when creating value, which is creating collaboration, alliances 
and networks to enable value creation on the platform. Some platforms seek to create this by 
innovating with external parties or solely relying on them to deliver innovative value propositions to 
the platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; 
Lee et al., 2010; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 2013). Additional collaboration benefits that platforms 
utilize include enabling positive network effects for business growth (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; 
Lee et al., 2010; Cusumano, 2011a; Cusumano, 2011b; Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary, 2016; 
Zhu & lansiti, 2019).  
1.2 Superior value creation of platform businesses  
The fast ability of platforms to scale up and utilize different parties in their value creation is why 
they are superior in value creation in comparison to many traditional businesses. A glimpse of this 
can be seen when comparing world’s most valuable companies by their market value as many 
platform businesses are leading the race (Desjardins, 2016; Statista, 2018; FXSSI, 2019; 
Theonlineinvestor.com, 2019). The same goes for world’s most valuable brands (Desjardins, 2017; 
Interbrand, 2017; Brand Finance Global 500, 2019) as the top is represented by platforms 
businesses. Given these things it seems that the change is happening globally. This same change is 
in motion but lagging when we compare companies based on their revenues. Yet even there we 
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have seen the rise of platform-based companies like Apple #11, Amazon #13, Alphabet #37, 
Microsoft #60 and Facebook #184 slowly climbing their way towards the top companies amongst 
Fortune Global 500 list (Fortune, 2019) as their revenue streams are showing signs of scale.  
However, the ongoing change in the business world is better illustrated with a time series when 
comparing businesses in general in the market. Since platform business logic tends to take more 
time in profit and revenue creation than in value creation, variables such as market or brand value 
might be better in capturing platform’s potential and future value. This is true as these businesses 
mature faster in their value creation and adaptation rate than they tend in finding a monetization 
model. The time series illustrate both the slow start and sudden success that expanding in scale 
enables means for successful platform companies. (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 
2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) As these companies started dominating the top five 
since year 2016, while being only little present in the previous decade shown in figure 2 along the 
market value of top five companies over 17 years. The current leaders are Apple, known for its 
wide product and service family around iPhone and Mac within platforms like App Store and 
iTunes. Amazon, known for its online store. Alphabet, best known for its brands Google, Android 
and YouTube. Microsoft known for its Windows operating system, Microsoft office and LinkedIn. 
Facebook that has also inquired Instagram and WhatsApp. (FXSSI, 2019) These stories have 
inspired other businesses to try their luck in a platform space.  
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Figure 2, Top five publicly traded companies by their market value over 17 years 
 
Adopted from Desjardins’ work (2016) and updated with 2018 figures from Statista (2018). 
1.3 Research questions and the main objectives   
Despite the many opportunities that platforms have and the huge successes of the few, many 
platform businesses struggle to survive and end up failing. The two biggest hurdles seem to be in 
the start and again when scaling the business. (Marmer et al., 2011; Cantamessa et al., 2018; U.S. 
Small Business Administration, 2019) To understand more of this phenomenon and what might 
create the success or failure, this thesis will contribute to current understanding by determining 
platform business strategies to uncover what strategies platforms utilize when starting the business 
and when seeking further growth.  
To support business decision makers and academia a theoretical framework is created to model 
platform business strategies. Thus, linking decision making closely to the selected platform type 
and the chosen value created for the key customer. Moreover, multiple important decisions are 
discussed and how different variables are likely to behave differently according to the chosen 
platform strategy. For instance, positive network effects play an important role within user 
acquisition and enabling value creation for e-marketplace platforms where as they play a minor role 
within standard SaaS offering. Similarly understanding social factors, advantages of location and 
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cultural proximity with the platform and its users are all factors that can help platforms to serve 
their purpose better and succeed within the changing market dynamics. Many of these decisions are 
in close link to multiple other decisions and often they open and close opportunities in other areas. 
Hence, the main attempt of this thesis is to answer what strategies platforms apply as they go in 
business and how they attempt to grow? 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section introduces the reader towards platform businesses explaining first key terms. It then 
moves into classifying platform businesses and continues with strategic decision making. The aim 
is to cover past findings and insights regarding the research question, what strategies platforms 
apply as they go in business and how they attempt to grow?  
2.1 Platform terminology In the simplest terms’ platforms are technical architectures that enable value creation within their 
ecosystems. However, there are several definitions of platforms in the literature (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2008; Tiwana, Konsynski & Bush, 2010; Yoo et al., 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; 
Seppälä et al., 2015; Ceccagnoli et al., 2017; Sebastian et al., 2017; Penttinen et al., 2018). 
Although there is variation among them, majority of the variation is explained through the context 
among it was used as some are more technical, broad or concise by nature.  
Similarly, the definitions among ecosystem vary as some believe them to represent nearly the set of 
functions and their interplay within the platform (Tiwana, Konsynski & Bush, 2010) while most 
include the parties involved in using the platform to be part of the ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2008; Yoo et al., 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Seppälä et al., 2015; Dufva et al., 2017). For the 
purposes of this thesis an ecosystem is defined in line with most of the literature. Ecosystem is both 
the people with an access to the platform and engaging with it as well as the entire platform. These 
people can be understood as individuals, units, organizations or other groups of people representing 
different interest groups that are essential or involved in the usage of the platform.  
2.1.1 Platform actors The most common groups within the platform ecosystem are the platform owner, the interface 
provider, complementors, suppliers, third party developers, partners and users. A platform may 
have one or more user group of the above mentioned. However, they often include more than one 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Yoo et al., 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Seppälä et al., 2015; 
Dufva et al., 2017).  
The platform owner tends to be the creator of the platform that also provides common assets and 
the technical infrastructure to support the platform. Often the platform owner also builds and 
manages the interface, but not necessarily. Complementors provide goods and services that expand 
the usage and value of the platform. These can include suppliers, partners or third-party developers. 
Suppliers tend to provide the main goods to the platform that are consumed. Sometimes the 
suppliers and the users are the same group, but often they may also differ. Partners may provide 
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additional value on top of the regular value provided by the suppliers making the value proposition 
of the platform more extensive and potentially seamless. Third-party developers may develop new 
extensions to the platform. Users mean the ultimate end-users of the platform that consume the 
good, this may be separate party from the others, or it may be partially the same or the same as the 
other groups. (Seppälä et al., 2015) 
2.1.2 Value creation in platforms Ultimately what enables platforms to create superior value and differentiates them from traditional 
businesses is that platforms use external resources extensively in value creation where as traditional 
companies rely on internal resources (see more extensive comparisons from table 1). While pipeline 
businesses can control and manage their entire line, knowing what’s the outcome exactly and decide 
what the end product or service will be like. Platforms instead trust others to decide what to produce 
(Goodwin, 2015; Seppälä et al., 2015; Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016) and provide tools, access 
point or ecosystem to facilitate it (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009).  
Table 1 Comparing traditional pipeline business with a platform business 
 
Own creation based on (Goodwin, 2015; Seppälä et al., 2015; Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016) 
Now, producing real products or services is an entirely different business than providing and 
supporting a platform as their end goals are rather different. Platforms don’t need heavy 
infrastructure to support their business in traditional sense as their value is mainly created online, 
providing access to things or people. Instead platforms need to figure how to get others to join their 
platform and to contribute and engage with it in order to build value. As noted by Goodwin (2015): 
“Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most popular 
media owner, creates no content. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has no inventory. And Airbnb, 
Pipeline Platform Author
the conventional “pipeline” businesses that have dominated industry for decades. Pipeline businesses create value by controlling a linear series of 
activities—the classic value-chain model. Inputs at one end of the chain (say, materials from suppliers) undergo a series of steps that transform 
them into an output that’s worth more: the finished product. Apple’s handset business is essentially a pipeline.
Platform businesses bring together producers and consumers in high-value exchanges. Their chief assets are information and interactions, which together are also the source of the value they create and their competitive advantage.
Alstyne, Parker & Choudary (2016)
Full stack companies like Tesla, Warby Parker,  BuzzFeed, Nest or 
Harry’s seek to ensure control by owning all layers. From R&D to 
marketing, from distribution to sales, these companies do it all. It’s a great 
way to keep profit in the family, yet it’s harder to scale and build.
are indescribably thin layers that sit on top of vast supply systems ( where the costs are) and interface with a huge number of people ( where the money is). There is no better business to be in. The New York Times needs to write, fact check, buy paper, print and distribute newspapers to get their ad money. Facebook provides a platform for us to write our own content
Goodwin (2015)
the previous business strategy that for long has followed product and service logic. the current platform businesses many aspects of the market economy become amplified: multisided markets, third parties that provide complementary products or services, co-creation mechanisms, managing boundary resources from both technical and controlling perspective. It seems that to gain best ecosystem benefit from platforms managing boundary resources from both technical and controlling perspective is going to be the key. 
Seppälä et al. (2015)
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the world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real estate. Something interesting is 
happening.” This business logic makes platforms dependent on other parties that expose the 
business towards a very different set of vulnerabilities than a traditional business. Now, companies 
can choose to operate as a pipeline or platform or as both. Apple has chosen the latter as their 
product business operates as a pipeline producing iPhones, iPods and Macs, but their App Store is 
an e-marketplace platform and their services such as iCloud and iTunes represent SaaS platforms.    
2.1.3 Governance  Governance and control mechanisms help to direct how the platform is used and by whom. 
Adjusting these control points will significantly influence if the platform can produce the value the 
platform owner aimed at as they direct the actions of the players in the platform. Enabling and 
disabling access to the platform is one controlling mechanism that the owner needs to decide on as 
well as what actions each party can make. There are multiple ways by which the platform owner 
can direct the participant towards the desired behavior and engagement like rewarding them via 
social and monetary benefits. Similarly, the platform architecture guides its participants as well as 
monitoring their behavior on the platform. One of the main goals of governance is that platform 
provides quality content for its users as having a lot of content isn’t the desired end goal. Since, low 
quality content may lower the value of engagement and hurt the platform in the process (Hagiu, 
2014; Edelman, 2015; Wan et al., 2017). (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
2.1.4 Boundary resources  Boundary resources seek to attract right kind of parties to join the platform by building and offering 
incentives and tools to participants. Boundary resources as seen in figure 3 refer to interfaces and 
rules within collaboration, legal, governance, functionality and technical application tools. These 
interfaces are needed so, that a wider community can contribute towards building, innovating and 
engaging in the platform. Interfaces and actions relating to them have a crucial function as to both 
restrict and enable production and development of applications. Restricting methods are used to 
create focus within the platform and to keep the control within the platform owner. Enabling 
functions seek to expand the existing applications within the platform. The platform owner can 
manipulate and direct resources within the platform via their governance and wealth management 
regarding patents and money flows. While exploiting the platform owner status in the expense of 
suppliers and third parties might seem tempting, the dependency of external parties’ involvement is 
likely to mitigate the act itself. As third parties provide innovation, technology, products and 
services to the platform. (Seppälä et al., 2015; Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016) 
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To make contributing and joining a platform as effortless, convenient and easy for suppliers and 
third parties, platforms tend to build business model covering all the actors and their involvement 
with regards to monetary compensation. Meaning that new joiners know in the beginning how they 
might gain a cash flow through the platform as well as what resources and other tools they have at 
their disposal. (Seppälä et al., 2015) These are crucial factors as new joiner carry risk when 
investing their efforts into joining a platform. (Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016) 
Figure 3, Boundary Resources 
 
Own creation, based on (Yoo et al., 2012; Seppälä et al., 2015; Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016) 
2.1.5 Level of control and openness  By open platform the thesis adopts a definition by Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne (2008) ”A 
platform is ‘open’ to the extent that: (1) restrictions are not placed on participation in its 
development, commercialization or use; and (2) any restrictions – for example, requirements to 
conform with technical standards or pay licensing fees – are reasonable and non-discriminatory, that 
is, they are applied uniformly to all potential platform participants.” When neither one of these 
claims are true the platform is closed and if the claims are partially true the platform is somewhere 
in between. Many platforms operate somewhere in between a closed and open system having some 
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restrictions and limitations in place while allowing other areas to be more openly managed. (Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
When a platform allows some level of openness and chooses to utilize third parties in their 
ecosystem, the level of control over the final product or service mastered by the external innovator 
can be greater or smaller than the platform owner’s. The least control was mastered by the external 
innovators within integrator platform model (also referred as industry platform, extended intranet 
platform or platform leader), while the platform owner holds most of the control over the final 
product. A moderate level of control is hold by external innovators within product platform (also 
referred as intranet platform). The most control held by third parties was found among multisided 
platforms (also referred as two-sided platforms or internet platforms) and the least by the platform 
owner. (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009) 
2.1.6 Positive network  Network effects at their very basic level mean that a business can attract more people, services and 
value towards itself as it grows. These are often referred as same same-side effects (also known as 
direct network effects) and cross-side effects (also known as indirect network effects) (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014; Hagiu, 2014; Tiwana, 2014; Seppälä et al., 2015; Zhu & lansiti, 2019). Network 
effects can be positive and negative, see figure 4. Thus, businesses seek to maximize positive 
network effects while mitigating negative ones from occurring (Seppälä et al., 2015; Zhu & lansiti, 
2019) as this strategy influences their ability to succeed. Positive network effects refer to the benefit 
that the platform users gain when new users join the platform (Seppälä et al., 2015; Van Alstyne & 
Parker, 2017; Zhu & lansiti, 2019).  
Figure 4, Network effects 
Own creation (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Hagiu, 2014;Tiwana, 2014; Seppälä et al., 2015; Zhu & 
lansiti, 2019) 
  
Positive 
same-side 
effects 
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cross-side 
effects 
Negative 
cross-side 
effects 
Negative 
same-side 
effects 
Brings growth and added 
value with each new 
participant or offer 
Effect in the 
same side 
Effect in the 
other side 
Destroys growth and 
added value with each 
new participant or offer 
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After a platform has found its initial user group or its main source of value creation it might attempt 
to expand its business beyond these by growing positive network effects. Positive same-side effects 
mean that the value of a platform grows when one of its homogeneous subgroups grows. For 
instance, in a multisided platform the side that grows gains the benefit thus the value for users 
become greater when a new user joins the platform. (Tiwana, 2014) Similarly complementaries may 
benefit when new suppliers, partners or third parties enter the platform (Tiwana, 2014) as the 
content of the platform becomes richer (Van Alstyne & Parker, 2017). Positive cross-side network 
effects occur when growth in one side attracts players to join the other side. A classic example is 
when growing user base attracts more complementaries to supply products and services for the 
platform users and vice versa. (Zhu & lansiti, 2019) These effects go however beyond users as they 
also apply to products as an increased demand of a single product, service or application is followed 
by an increased demand within its compatible and complementing products, services and 
applications (Seppälä et al., 2015).  
Just like positive network effects can scale value and growth to the platform, negative network 
effects can destroy it as fast if not managed. Negative network effects refer to the lost value of the 
platform. This can happen through (1) users’ disintegration by switching to another platform or 
lowering their activity level in the platform also referred as multihoming (Cusamano, 2011; Wan et 
al., 2017; Zhu & lansiti, 2019). (2) If the technical capacity of the platform can no longer facilitate 
the exchange. Once the platform can no longer satisfy all the inquiries as its capacity has been 
exceeded positive network effects become negative network effects instead (Seppälä et al., 2015). 
(3) If one of the subgroups becomes too dominant in contrast to other subgroups it can also weaken 
the platform’s ability to create value. (4) If the aim of the platform or its design or controlling 
mechanisms are weak or become weakened by each new joiner to the ecosystem, the platform will 
become less efficient and able to deliver its value to its ecosystem. (Hagiu, 2014; Edelman, 2015; 
Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Wan et al., 2017) 
2.1.7 Pricing models  Pricing models are used to monetize a platform. To do this efficiently, platforms are encouraged to 
apply multiple pricing models, to tie the price closely together with value created for each group. 
This also reduces platform’s vulnerability and makes the earning more stable. (Brunn, Jensen & 
Skovgaard, 2002) Pricing is also used to lower the entry level to the platform (Brunn, Jensen & 
Skovgaard, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Edelman, 2015). This can be done by offering a 
freemium, lowering the price, offering a free trial, implementing flexible pricing model or 
subsidizing usage. These prizing techniques can be applied to one or more sides of the platform. 
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These prizing techniques tend to evolve and change as the platform gains more attraction (Wan et 
al., 2017). By selecting different pricing mechanisms, the platform can try to attract the right parties 
to join and potentially guide the growth on different sides. (Hagiu, 2014; Edelman, 2015; Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Wan et al., 2017)  
Once a platform has attracted enough participants and activity, they tend to change their business 
model. Many reconstruct it in a way, that the party that is benefitting the most from the platform 
value pays the most from accessing it. An example of this kind of differentiating business model is 
Google. They provide many services free of change for consumers, whereas businesses pay for their 
services. Offering these services for free to consumers is called a freemium model. It has helped 
the company to gain more attraction which has enabled the company to charge more money from 
businesses on its advertising spaces like Google maps and Gmail by applying advertising fees. 
(Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 2015) 
When platforms wish to charge users, they may implement a pay-as-you-go model. The idea is that 
a user only pays for the added value received while it protects users from low usage and limited 
interest towards the product or service. Pay-as-you-go model has replaced flat-fee model, where the 
income is more predictable, but the payer carries partial risk of the success of the payed good or 
service. (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 2015)  
While pay-as-you-go offers great flexibility to the payee, a more predictable prizing model for the 
platform might be utilizing transaction fees, license fees or subscription fees (Brunn, Jensen & 
Skovgaard, 2002). Any of these models may additionally utilize a free trial or cheaper starting prize 
that will further lower the entry barrier to try the platform.  
Another way to boost a platform’s engagement while offering a discount for trying the product or 
service is to use a subsidizing model. This is especially used in e-marketplace platforms, that seek 
early joiners to grow the platform. This model can be applied to attract two or more sides to a 
market. An example of two-sided subsidizing model is Lyft, a ride sharing service. They decided to 
pay for early joined drives, not by the miles driven, but simply being on call in case customers 
would appear. Simultaneously, it offered five free rides for early on joiners in some cities. These 
two subsidies reinforced each other, helping the company to establish business operations in new 
cities. Subsidizing like this, may accumulate significant expenses for the business. However, it can 
be justified based on the believe, that once the platform reaches scale the platform will become 
desirable with less or no subsidizing. (Edelman, 2015) 
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2.2 Platform business models  Organizations choose the best platform for their needs based on what purpose the platform serves 
and how it works. Many organizations engage with the first level of platforms, being the product 
platform for internal usage whereas fewer engage in multisided platforms that can include many 
players. (Seppälä et al., 2015) These platform types are illustrated in table 2. However, these 
classifications aren’t the only ones available, therefore others will be also introduced in this chapter.  
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Table 2, Overview of different platform types in the literature 
 
Own creation (Muffatto, & Roveda, 2000; Simpson, Maier & Mistree, 2001; Gawer & Cusumano, 
2008; Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Cusumano, 2011b; Hagiu & 
Spulber, 2013; Seppälä et al., 2015). 
Product platform Platform leader Multisided platform Companies have less control with the product platform model, in which external innovators build 
“on top” of a foundation technology and then sell the resulting products to customers. The platform owner might directly contract with the external innovators and have some additional control over them through the technical design of the core technology, but it is the external innovators (and not the platform owner) who directly transact with the end-users. Thus, the external innovators typically have more control than they would in the integrator business model. They generally have, for instance, greater freedom to set prices and to retain the residual rights of control over their technical developments, thus providing them with more entrepreneurial autonomy. (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009)
In the integrator platform model, the platform is wedged between external innovators and customers. 
In other words, the platform’s owner sells to customers, conferring upon the company a relatively high degree of control. Some platform leaders like Apple has taken this strategy with its App Store by controlling tightly both content and the technical aspect while benefiting financially over its integrator role and taking 30% of the revenues. Its powerful position enables it to dictate the rules of the platform. (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009)
In the two-sided (or multisided) platform model, external innovators and customers are free to transact directly with one another as long as they also affiliate with the platform owner. In such cases, the platform facilitates the transactions and interactions between the two parties, although the external innovators do not need to interact directly with the platform owner during the design, development and manufacturing of a new product. Nevertheless, the platform owner can still impose some degree of control over external innovators by, for instance, issuing to them various rules and regulations as a condition for their affiliation. (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009)
Intranet platform was mainly for product development for creating product and service families. The users of these platforms involved mainly R&D researchers. The platform was used mainly for the creation and evolution of product and service families, consumer variation and product or service variation. These variations were made through modularity and variation within scale to be packed according consumer segmentation. Examples of these are product families with automobile and mobile phone industries where similar offerings were differentiated to better cater different customer segment needs. (Seppälä et al., 2015)
Extended intranet platform was a control point within industrial ecosystems. This enabled the provider to gain profits without producing any goods while harming the aggregated economy of that ecosystem. An example of this would be the rivalry 
between different web browsers in the late 90’s. When Microsoft added its own browser as the default browser within its operating system it harmed the rivalry between browsers within its own platform. This shaped the idea of a platform from being internal tool to external tool through which a third-party provider could provide complementors that expand the usage of the original product, service or technology that is provided by one or more companies. (Seppälä et al., 2015)
Internet platform is an enabler of new kind of transactions between two or more parties in a marketplace. This was expanded to cover both technical and contractual boundary resources. (Seppälä et al., 2015) 
Importance of companies enhancing their new product development process through a multi-product strategy. This means planning the development of a product family upon a platform, which allows shorter lead times in developing new derivative models. The platform itself has proven to be more flexible when given a modular architecture, so this shifts attention onto evaluating product platform architecture. (Muffatto, & Roveda, 2000)
An industry platform is a foundation technology or service that is essential for a broader, interdependent ecosystem of businesses. The platform requires complementary innovations to be useful, and vice versa. An industry platform, therefore, is no longer under the full control of the originator, even though it may contain certain proprietary elements. (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Multisided platforms (MSPS) are technologies, products or services that create value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two or more customer or participant groups. (Hagiu, 2014)
Scale-based product families derived from scalable product platforms that can be exploited from both a functional and a manufacturing standpoint to increase the potential benefits of having a common platform. (Simpson, Maier & Mistree, 2001)
Platform leaders are companies that do not just sell standalone products. They have a foundation technology that is sufficiently open so that outside firms can provide complementary products and services, ranging from prerecorded videotapes to software applications and downloadable digital content. The value of the platform and complements can grow exponentially with positive feedback loops. 
These “network effects” make the platform, and the complements, increasingly valuable (and profitable) as more users, application developers, service providers, content providers, device makers, and other ecosystem players such as advertisers adopt the same platform. (Cusumano, 2011b)
Two-sided platform businesses, those for which the costs of reversing participation decisions are negligible, generally face a critical mass constraint that must be satisfied at launch if the business is to be viable. This constraint, which is two-dimensional for two-sided platforms, does not involve production scale economies or fixed costs. We show that it depends instead on the nature of the network effects 
linking the platform’s two customer groups, the distribution of tastes among potential customers in both groups, and the nature of out-ofequilibrium dynamics. (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010)
A product platform is largely proprietary and under 
one company’s control (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Platform leaders are companies that drive industrywide innovation for an evolving system of separately developed pieces of technology (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008)
Many two-sided platforms provide content, known as first-party content, often for free or as part of a product bundle, which makes participation more attractive to one side (typically, buyers), sometimes independently of the presence of the other side (typically, sellers).  (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013)
Platform types
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When moving beyond the definitions and how to group and discuss different platforms it is 
essential to understand, what is the purpose for a platform’s existence. Thus, the value creation is 
explained in each type accompanied by some differentiating factors or use cases in figure 5 
enabling separating the terms from each other. However, as these five terms may be overlapping 
with each three concepts (1) e-marketplace, (2) software as a service (SaaS) and (3) social 
networking sites are further discussed separately below. 
Figure 5, Platform models 
 
Own creation (Lee et al. 2010; Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Seppälä et al. 2015; Strowel and Vergote, 
2016) 
2.2.1 E-marketplace  The electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) literature is very consistent ultimately referring for 
online marketplaces where people can buy and sell goods and services (Standing et al., 2006; Lee et 
al., 2010; Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Wan et al., 2017). Although 
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variations within terminology exist as some authors use the terms e-marketplaces (Eng, 2004; Scott 
& Scott, 2004; Standing et al., 2006; Tao, Chen & Chang, 2007; Thakur, 2019), e-commerce sites 
(Hagiu & Spulber, 2013), online markets (Strowel and Vergote, 2016), “electronic market, e-
Market” (Standing et al., 2006) and more simply marketplace (Oliver, 1990; Evans & Schmalensee, 
2010; Cusumano, 2011b; Hagiu, 2014). Yet, the concept itself seems to be well defined and well 
covered in platform literature within topics of platform leadership, two-sided and multisided 
platforms. This thesis adopts the term of e-marketplace as it is less ambiguous than its shorter 
version, marketplace, as the term can be used to describe both online and offline markets and has 
more historical package whereas the thesis only concerns itself with online marketplaces. 
Brunn, Jensen and Skovgaard (2002) defined e-marketplaces “as interactive business communities 
providing a central market space where multiple companies can engage in B2B e-commerce and/or 
other e-business activities.” This was followed by Eng (2004) with a rather similar definition of an 
electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) to be “as a many-to-many, web-based trading and 
collaboration solution that enables companies to more efficiently buy, sell, and collaborate on a 
global scale” as well as to manage supply chain processes (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Eng, 
2004). ”The primary objectives are to streamline complex business processes and gain efficiencies. 
It is based on the notion of aggregating buyers and sellers in a single contact point to allow 
participant organizations to enjoy greater economies of scale and liquidity; and to buy or sell 
anything easily, quickly and cost effectively. E-marketplaces also enable companies to eliminate 
geographical barriers and expand globally to reap profits in new markets that were once out of 
reach.” (Eng, 2004) Standing et al. (2006) added that these markets take place “in cyberspace with a 
price-making mechanism such as catalog aggregators, auction, reverse auction, or exchange.” These 
markets can be further “categorized into three types; i.e. sell side e-Marketplace, buy side e-
Marketplace, and 3rd party e-Marketplace.” (Standing et al., 2006) “E-marketplace can be further 
classified based on industry type into horizontal, vertical, and diagonal market. The major 
difference between horizontal and vertical markets is that a vertical market targets specific products 
and services … while a horizontal market targets multi-industries” that cover a variety of different 
industries (Tao, Chen & Chang, 2007).  
2.2.2 Software as a service (SaaS) The current Software as a service (SaaS) focused literature is rather technical (Concha et al., 2010; 
Lee, Park & Lim, 2013), concerned of implementation (Concha et al., 2010; Shuying, Shuai & Sun, 
2013) and or changing current information technology (Focacci et al., 2003; Bibi, Katsaros, & 
Bozanis, 2012), risks involved and cost analysis of potential alternatives (Bibi, Katsaros, & 
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Bozanis, 2012). These papers seem to share a common understanding of what SaaS is although the 
term often varies or stays undefined. For this paper a definition by Lee, Park and Lim (2013) is used 
“SaaS can be defined as applications and computer-based services delivered and managed from a 
remote center to multiple customers via the Internet or a VPN” They further explain that “The SaaS 
provider acts as a mediator, mediating services between independent software vendors (ISVs). SaaS 
customers do not possess, manage or maintain the applications, but only use them as final products 
by accessing services with IT support. While SaaS is advantageous in that it reduces the repair costs 
of application-based construction and maintenance, the risk of data leakage becomes a major 
disadvantage because application servers are constructed by outside companies.” (Lee, Park & Lim, 
2013) Despite the risks of SaaS it is growing into a mainstream solution within software-based 
solutions for businesses (Focacci et al., 2003; Concha et al., 2010; Lee, Park & Lim, 2013) due to 
its convenience (Bibi, Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012), cost-efficiency (Focacci et al., 2003; Bibi, 
Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012; Shuying, Shuai & Sun, 2013) and speed (Focacci et al., 2003; Bibi, 
Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012). For these reasons SaaS is optimal for complex and heavy enterprise 
investments “such as CRM, enterprise resource planning (ERP), social computing, and e-
commerce” (Bibi, Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012). Some of the well-known SaaS are services like 
Google Docs and Salesforce CRM (Bibi, Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012). 
2.2.3 Social networking sites (SNS)  
Although social networking sites (SNS) have become a distinct part of today’s social encounters the 
area has been explored academically rather limitedly. Majority of the papers about SNS have a 
focused on marketing perspective for commercial usage (Ullman, 2012; Li, Liu & Li, 2014; Park, 
Jun & Lee, 2015; Ansari et al., 2018) or have a behavioral aspect often concerned on how these 
networks shape people (Kwon, Stefanone & Barnett, 2014; Lee, 2014; Lim & Choi, 2017; 
Pornsakulvanich, 2017; Yang & Robinson, 2018) instead of simply focusing on exploring and 
explaining SNS. However, based on these papers SNS play an important role when we build our 
own identities (Lee, 2014; Yang & Robinson, 2018), connect with others (Lee, 2014; Li, Liu & Li, 
2014; Park, Jun & Lee, 2015; Ansari et al., 2018), expand our network (Pornsakulvanich, 2017; 
Ansari et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018) and seek attention (Ansari et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018). In 
addition, social media provides means for companies and brands to get attention, connect and 
engage with individuals, building brand knowledge (Ansari et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018) and brand 
communities with desire to both deliver information and appeal for buyers’ emotions and values 
(Gao et al., 2018).  
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When it comes to literature, papers often leave the terms around SNS undefined or vague. Due to 
this and the fact that there isn’t clear consistency among the terms used it seems that the 
terminology is to some extent still in formation. However, social networking sites (Bergman et al., 
2011; Carpenter, 2012; Kwon, Li, Liu & Li, 2014; Stefanone & Barnett, 2014; Park, Jun & Lee, 
2015; Pornsakulvanich, 2017) is by far the most common term, whereas social network sites 
(Ullman, 2012; Lee, 2014; Lim & Choi, 2017; Yang & Robinson, 2018) appear approximately 
every fifth time in comparison to it. Moreover, both terms have adopted the same abbreviation that 
leaves the impression that authors don’t necessarily differentiate between them. While these two 
terms occupy the literature only few diverge from these being social media networks (Cusumano, 
2011a; Liu et al., 2012), social network (Ansari et al., 2018), social networks (Hagiu & Spulber, 
2013; Strowel and Vergote, 2016), social networking Web sites (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) and 
social media (Gao et al., 2018).  
Despite the differences in terms, it seems that authors do use these terms in alignment with great 
consistency referring for social network platforms, which enable people to interact with both things 
and one another by producing and browsing through content. (Pornsakulvanich, 2017). However, 
there is one exception with Ansari et al., (2018) that use the term of social network in unexpected 
and wider manner for explaining relation between people amongst acquaintances and others instead 
of referring towards SNS (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994; Newman & Park, 2003). For the purposes of 
this paper a term of SNS is adopted following Pornsakulvanich’s (2017) definition SNS are “one of 
the most popular platforms for people around the world to connect, participate, communicate, and 
share their information and feelings. Social networking sites and applications such as Facebook, 
Instagram, and Line are online communities that allow members to build and broadcast their profile 
information and interact with others. These online social networks allow users to do various 
activities such as sharing photos, sending messages, and playing online games.” 
2.3 Platform strategies  
This chapter presents some of the most important strategic contributions in the field. Starting by 
analyzing strategic variables utilized by key literature in the field in table 3. The table seeks to find 
consensus and to compile knowledge from the different papers. Thus, the most used variables have 
been nominated as (1) user acquisition, (2) stand-alone value, (3) credibility, (4) profitability, (5) 
design and (6) openness. Now using these variables is little problematic as these are by no means 
mutually exclusive groups, but rather heavily interlinked to one another. Yet, this aspect is the 
reason why understanding and deciding strategic decisions based on all variables odd to be key 
concern and interest of all platform business. Thus, they are explained below in details.  
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Table 3, Key variables when studying platform strategy 
Study User acquisition Stand-alone value Credibility Profitability Design Openness 
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one set of users’ 
being the consumers 
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complementary 
products. 
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critical resources in 
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  Platform openness 
refers to whether and 
to what degree an 
outsider needs 
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platform owner to 
access or build on the 
platform. Own creation 
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Like noted above on table 3, its variables are rather heavily interlinked. Although a platform would 
like to put their best efforts in building all these variables based on the best knowledge and 
implementing them in their platform, it isn’t the recommendation. Rather, a platform should 
consider these variables as important decisions that have to be made consciously as these variables 
are heavily interlinked. Thus, weighting variables and decisions across multiple variables should be 
done simultaneously instead of individually by each variable. to give an example Eisenmann, 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2008) noted that openness and innovation factors are closely linked to 
decisions over how fragmented or integrated the solution is as well as how easy its monetization 
and controlling platform’s intellectual property rights will be. Hence, the way these factors are 
interlinked is illustrated in figure 6. The authors emphasized that instead of having an open or 
closed platform, there are all kinds of variations that can be explored to find a suitable mixture 
between the two options. Similarly, the rest of variables have multiple balance points between the 
two extreme ones. (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2008)  
Figure 6, Five factors showcasing different platform models 
 
Own creation (Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2008; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
The three examples that are illustrated in figure 6 are a conceptual support to showcase some 
varieties among plausible combination while simplifying the equation. For instance, ease of 
Open system
Innovation
Fragmented
solution
Ease of controlling
intellectual
property rights
Ease of monetizing
Fragmented and open solution Integrated and closed solution Balanced
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monetizing and controlling property rights go along best with a closed system, internal innovation 
and integrated solution. On opposite to this is an open, innovative, fragmented solution with more 
difficulty in monetizing it and controlling intellectual property rights. Instead of creating an equally 
balanced solution, it’s good to focus on some areas. Depending on the execution of the platform a 
part of the solution might operate on different logic than others. It is also important to recall here 
that the restrictions based upon different user groups play a part. Meaning that what is open for 
internal developers isn’t necessary open to third party developers nor to the different sides of the 
market. However, the more complex the distribution of boundary resources are or the variety of 
access points the more complex the business model becomes together with managing the platform. 
(Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
Another pairing how these factors are interlinked is to look at user acquisition, profitability, design 
and openness as these are closely tied to positive and negative network effects as well as to 
platform’s ability to scale. Since positive network effects enable companies to grow and gain 
benefits, they have developed different techniques to help them succeed in it, illustrated in figure 7. 
The influencing variables are here pricing, governance, control and shared boundary resources that 
seek to create positive network effects for the benefit of scaling the platform. Unlike the five 
interlinked variables above, here the interlinked decisions aren’t as well understood. While low 
pricing lowers the entry barriers and might stimulate the positive network effect it is only true if 
right people are targeted. Similarly, while boundary resources might attract individuals to the 
platform, positive network effects are gained only if right people also take desired actions, that can 
be controlled via governance and other rewards.  
Figure 7, Seeking positive network effects 
 
Own creation (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Hagiu, 2014; Tiwana, 2014; Seppälä et al., 2015; Zhu 
& lansiti, 2019) 
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While finding a perfect balance between variables is important it doesn’t yet secure platforms’ 
success. Since all platforms need to find first some users before network effects can help them to 
scale. This part focuses on how to attract the first set of users to a platform, while it may be also 
utilized to gain additional growth. Succeeding to engage people and get them to join a new platform 
on its early days is one of the main strategic dilemmas of platforms. While all platforms may 
struggle with this, this dilemma is especially associated with e-marketplace platforms as their value 
creation is more heavily dependent on multiparty engagement that seems to be the most difficult to 
execute. This is what the literature calls a chicken-and-egg problem (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 
2002; Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Hagiu, 2014; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). The 
dilemma derives from the platform’s need to get early joiners, while no one wants to be the early 
bird joining the platform. Since the cost are higher in terms of time and resources invested to 
become a member, than what the value the platform can offer at the time. (Edelman, 2015) This is 
why many companies fail in their attempts to build an e-marketplaces (Evans & Schmalensee, 
2010; Hagiu, 2014; Edelman, 2015). As a response to this problem authors like Brunn, Jensen and 
Skovgaard (2002), Edelman (2015) and Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary (2016) have built 
strategies on how companies might attempt to avoid this dilemma. The following four suggestions 
can be applied to any platform seeking to engage new parties to join. However, these decisions on 
onboarding and attracting traffic should be further combined with supporting decisions on 
monetization, design, technological compatibility and business strategies to get ideal outcome 
(Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). 
The first solution is 1) to utilize existing platform where needed participants are already at 
(Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). This could mean 1.1) that the needed 
parties are on the platform owner’s existing marketplace (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
or 1.2) that needed user data is publicly available or 1.3) that parties needed are in another platform, 
but these people can be attracted from the existing platform (Edelman, 2015) or 1.4) that a platform 
seeks to connect with another platform and become part of it to utilize its engaged parties (Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016).  
A Second suggestion is 2) to build value for a small set of users that others wish to connect, and the 
network will grow based on others’ wishes to connect with the current userbase. This could refer to 
2.1) people that are already engaging with one another. The difficulty is that users move to a new 
social network only if the new platform offers something remarkably different. As the value is built 
by social interactions the platform relies on the networks critical mass is even more important. This 
strategy benefits from dense physical area but doesn’t require it if a single niche is well covered. 
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(Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) Alternatively, the platform could 2.2) rely 
on key users that are believed to determine whether the platform will become successful in other 
user groups due to key users’ participation. The incentive offered for these key users may vary 
between monetary reward to a social benefit or attractive partnership deal. These may include 
exclusive deals or secure compatibility. However, engaging in this strategy may become rather 
expensive depending on the deal made. (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 2015; Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
Third strategy is 3) to build a non-competitive ecosystem around the platform by 3.1) targeting 
producers that wish to drag their customers to the platform with them. These are players that have 
an incentive to boost the platform themselves in hopes to target their customers better. To succeed 
you need to be a trusted platform, protecting other parties’ intellectual property rights and to have a 
compelling future vision to onboard producers. Alternatively, the focus could 3.2) evolve around 
products or services that benefit a single set of users forming an industry niche. Both strategies here 
might benefit from only charging the supplier once they gain value from the platform as this will 
lower their entry barrier. (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne 
& Choudary, 2016)  
Fourth alternative is 4) to trigger simultaneous on-boarding rapidly growing the userbase of the 
platform by using one or more traditional push marketing strategies. This is often done by 
marketing efforts in a specific event or location with a dense area of target group. (Parker, Van 
Alstyne & Choudary, 2016) 
While the literature does identify some tactics that can help platform businesses direct their efforts 
and identify areas where to focus as well as what to consider, it doesn’t connect these to specific 
platform types nor conclusive platform strategies. Similarly, the key strategic variables identified 
for platforms as user acquisition, standalone value, credibility, profitability, design and openness, 
stay disconnected in many areas to these tactics’ describer. Moreover, the discussion around key 
strategic variables don’t give clear guidance on how to implement or prioritize these variables 
according the platform type, but rather describe the optimal state after implementing these 
successfully. It is clear, that the current understanding of strategic differences and how to combine 
tactics towards each platform type is yet forming as well as how to classify and separate platform 
types from each other as majority of papers focus on a single platform type. Therefore, there is clear 
need for this study in the platform field to better understand what strategies platforms apply as they 
go in business and how they attempt to grow? 
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3. METHODOLOGY  This section lays out the methods used for studying platform strategies. It explains what, when, how 
and why the data was collected and analyzed to answer the research question set for this study, what 
strategies platforms apply as they go in business and how they attempt to grow? 
3.1 Applied research method  The most relevant past studies in relation to the research question are listed in table 5. As seen, the 
predominant research method used in this subject matter is analyzing multi case studies. Although 
most of the work seems to rely on consulting work done for case companies, several papers have 
also utilized secondary data such as literature or public records by exploring company websites and 
annual reports. Since understanding of platform strategies is still developing acquiring new primary 
data should be for the benefit of the platform field. Hence, the methodology of this thesis follows 
qualitative research practice. The goal of this research is to build a theoretical framework that 
enhances the current understanding of the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991; Fox-
Wolfgramm, 1997; Woodside & Wilson, 2003). Thus, this thesis will follow the example set by the 
field by first acquiring knowledge from past papers discussing the topic prior moving to interview 
platform companies about their strategies applying in-depth multi case study structure. After 
analyzing 14 interview results, additional knowledge acquired by testing and using 70 platforms 
will be applied to the proposed theoretical framework by this thesis to validate and potentially 
improve the framework. 
Table 4, Key contributing papers on platform strategy at launch 
Study Research problem Data source Platform type 
Brunn, Jensen & 
Skovgaard (2002) 
The most important, the least understood and the unique strategic 
issues inherent in the setup of the e-marketplace business model. 
An in-depth case study of 
an e-marketplace 
E-marketplace 
Gawer & Cusumano 
(2002) 
How to become a platform leader? Multiple case studies Platform leadership 
Gawer & Cusumano 
(2008) 
How companies become platform leaders? 6 in-depth case studies  Platform leadership 
Lee et al. (2010) To investigate the critical success factors of platform leadership in 
the web 2.0 based service business environment. 
Multiple investigators 
examined 3 firms using 
secondary data 
Platform leadership 
Hagiu (2014) What are some of the strategic issues that multisided platforms 
(MSPs) face? 
Oven 10 in-depth case 
studies  
Multisided platforms 
Edelman (2015) How to launch a digital platform? Multiple corporate cases Digital platform 
Parker, Van Alstyne 
& Choudary (2016)  
How to launch a multisided platform business without running into 
a chicken-or-egg dilemma? 
Multiple case studies Multisided platforms 
Wan et al. (2017) To identify the essential tensions regarding platform strategies and 
analyze how to balance them within platform ecosystems. 
Literature review of 109 
papers published between 
2000 and 2016 
Multisided platforms 
Own creation 
3.2 Interview sample selection The main reason why interviews were chosen as the primary source of data was because the 
secondary information available online or through research papers aren’t necessarily extensive 
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enough, nor comparable. Given this, having an opportunity to hear firsthand experiences, decisions 
and views was extremely helpful in gaining better understanding of platform strategies. Moreover, 
the examples used in past literature would have been too limiting for this study. Moreover, some of 
the past literature rely on online resources, when the data set is very limited as very few platform 
companies openly disclose their business model including monetization models, financial status, 
learnings and driving forces to the public. Thus, collecting primary data and securing anonymity 
were essential to gain useful insights into platform strategies. 
Since the primary data was obtained via case studies a random sample was ruled out to be 
inappropriate in a small sample. Instead, theoretical sampling was used to ensure that the sample 
size would contain enough both variety and similarities between the cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). To 
increasing similarity selected cases were businesses running established platform business 
operations. This was also the prerequisite to be eligible for the sample. The variables increasing 
variation were business model, business size, industry and maturity. To increase level playing field 
and feasibility all the interviewed people were Finns with companies that had a contact point to 
Finland. Moreover, the persons interviewed were targeted as capable persons to discuss the 
companies they represented from a platform perspective. 
To identify appropriate organizations the researcher read though technology news, App Store 
application listings and blog post about platforms. The potential list of companies emerged through 
reading annual reports, organization’s web pages, previous interviews and LinkedIn. A list of 31 
platform companies and startups was made and additional list of 10 incumbents.  
After the companies had been identified the second part was to identify best possible interviewees 
within the organization and to gain their contact detail. For this mainly CEOs, founders and other 
members of leadership were considered and contacted. These members were selected for their 
insights of the company, its strategy and operational choices. Founders and co-founders were 
prioritized in startups as they had the longest experience with the company and could provide wide 
perspective to the case study. For separate units within multinationals mainly CEO’s were 
considered as they had the best perspective on how their operations linked to the multinational, how 
this ownership shaped the decision making and what the current direction was. It was understood 
that these people might lack the time perspective, as they might have been rather recently chosen 
for the position. For incumbents a different criterion was applied as there the heads of platform 
business units or operations were under different job titles. None of the incumbents applied similar 
titles for the heads of these operations or units and the people targeted had to be handpicked and 
identified separately that was more time consuming and difficult in comparison to startups and 
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separate units within multinationals. However, most of the people were Head of partnerships, 
innovation, ecosystem or digital strategy. It was understood that these people might lack the time 
perspective, as they might have been rather recently chosen for the position. 
When doing the final changes to the list of appropriate interviewees access and feasibility were 
taken into consideration. Hence, potential organizations were limited to ones having operations in 
the capital region of Finland, with CEOs, founders and heads of the organization living or working 
in the capital region to be able to set up face to face meeting flexibly. Approximately one third of 
the contacted companies were personal acquaintances of the researcher, that might have led towards 
a more positive reaction from the interviewees since the interview acceptance rate was great as 20 
organization were approached and 16 of them were open for an interview. Later the information 
gathered during this period was used as complementary information to confirm and specify 
company details. 
3.3 Interview sample The different variables to increase variation among the interviewed sample were business model, 
business size, industry and maturity. These were chosen based on the believe that these variables 
might influence the platform strategy adopted or shape it along the way. A more detailed 
description of the chosen case companies can be seen in Table 5. As maturity was one of the 
variables, both mature and infant businesses were included in the interviews. This was justified as 
mature businesses have experienced the most when it comes to business life cycle, but their 
memories might not be as vivid from the early stages. Moreover, the key personnel might have 
changed, and the experiences wouldn’t be primary information. People that don’t have firsthand 
experience can’t describe what the company has gone through in such detail and accuracy that 
would provide best results. Thus, the study chose to select organizations from all life cycle stages. 
Admittingly, the sample is far from perfect in this respect as the maturity of businesses are in their 
growth stage and other areas were underrepresented. Taking this into consideration, it is possible 
that greater differences would arise between maturity if the sample had been different. This could 
have provided insights into how to grow a platform business and the strategies applied. Regardless, 
there are clear difficulties in trying to include more matured businesses. Many platform companies 
are rather new. If we seek knowledge from businesses beyond 20+ years, the answers might reflect 
more what used to be relevant in platform business or direct the sample more towards successful 
businesses. If the sample would focus on new startups it could mean that the business models 
studied here would be potentially too radical to become viable. Thus, a combination of different 
maturity levels among sample organizations were targeted.  
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Table 5, Background information of the case companies 
 
Own creation.  
Business size and its format were considered in sample as platform, business units and incumbents 
might approach platform strategies differently based on the capital and resources at their disposal. 
Startups formed most of the sample. In many ways this was good as they can be reviewed as the 
most restricted form of platform business as they tend to have the least resources and capital at their 
disposal. Thus, the group gave good understanding of the MVP and strategic focus of each 
platform. Moreover, the platform strategies attempted by startups weren’t as risky or capital 
intensive as the strategies attempted by multinational units or incumbents. This suggest that startups 
have tendency to be more careful and more committed than other forms explored in this study. 
These differences are simultaneously clear indicates why many incumbents rather acquire or partner 
up with platform startups than starting platform businesses themselves.  
3.4 Interview sample gathering  14 interviews were conducted, 12 by face-to-face meetings and two via email. In the email 
interviews interview questions were send to the interviewees and they replied by sending a voice 
recording or written reply to the questions. The face-to-face meetings were the preferred choice as 
the researcher gained a better sense of the situation, when observing interviewee’s body language 
and other non-linguistic signs of communication as well as being able to ask additional questions, 
clarifications and ensure shared understanding. Most of the interviews were extremely insightful, 
relaxed and good experiences. However, two of the interviews were clearly not as successful as the 
others. Since these responses lacked richness in detail and these two interviewees seemed reluctant 
Code Industry Business type Employees Maturity Operating years Platform business
Case 1 Communications Startup 1-10 Decline >10 Main business
Case 2 Real Estate Startup 1-10 Growth <5 Main business
Case 3 Information Technology Startup 11-50 Growth <5 Main business
Case 4 Communications Startup 1-10 Launch 5-10 Main business
Case 5 Heathcare Startup 1-10 Early Growth 5-10 Main business
Case 6 Renting Startup 11-50 Growth 5-10 Main business
Case 7 Payments Unit of multinational 11-50 Growth 5-10 Main business
Case 8 Banking Unit of multinational >50 Growth 5-10 Main business
Case 9 Banking Incumbent >50 Mature >10 Additional stream of business
Case 10 Retail Unit of multinational >50 Mature 5-10 Main business
Case 11 Conference Incumbent >50 Mature >10 Additional stream of businessCase 12 Heathcare Startup 1-10 Early Growth <5 Main business
Case 13 Sales Startup 11-50 Growth <5 Main business
Case 14 Accounting Startup 11-50 Growth 5-10 Main business
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
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or uncomfortable in revealing company specific information beyond what had been previously 
published online.  
All the interviewees were first contacted via private chat or email depending on the relationship 
between the researcher and the interviewee as personal contacts received a private message instead 
of slightly more formal email. Examples of these messages can be seen in Appendix 11. Potential 
interview times and places were later exchanged in these conversations. All the interviewees 
received the interview guide shown in Appendix 12 prior the interview. Most of the interviewees 
were met in their own office buildings and the interviews were held behind closed doors. Key 
terminologies were explained when needed in the context of the question if immediate response 
wasn’t made or the interviewee seemed to hesitate at the question at hand. Most of the interviews 
included around five to ten clarifications about terms used. This illustrates potentially bad formation 
of the interview questions and or how confident the interviewees were with platform terminology or 
how relevant the concepts are in their work. Good and simple questions were at times difficult to 
form, without including specific platform terminology while avoiding leading questions thus 
explaining usage of explanations within the interviews. 
All the interview material was gathered during November 2018. In total 12 interviews lasted 
together for 14 hours and 7 minutes. After each meeting the researcher wrote instant notes about the 
interview content, how it compared with other interviews, what interesting or unexpected insights 
had risen, what classifications might work for reviewing the data and any adjustments, that might 
improve the interview guide. The first three interviews shaped the interview guide as some topics 
became evidently more fruitful in terms of the interviewee contributions as well as enhancing the 
current knowledge of the topic. In the following interviews the priority was put on these topics. 
After each interview, interview guide was reviewed and refined few times changing wording, order 
of the questions or time spend on each topic. However, these changes were minimal and are little 
likely to interfere with the comparability of the data.  
Since all interviewees were Finns together with the interviewer, the cultural and linguistic barriers 
were minimal in the interview setting. Although, most of the interviews were completed mainly in 
English. The reason why English was preferred was to mitigate potential flaws in translations that 
could have changed the meanings. Moreover, English recordings enabled machine pre-transcribed 
interviews that made the workload more manageable. However, all the interviewees had the 
possibility to choose Finnish as the interview language as well as to switch back and forth during 
the interview. This linguistic flexibility seemed to work well as the individuals were freely 
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describing their thoughts and experiences. Moreover, the interviewed group spoke rather fluently 
English, explaining only few parts in their native language. Thus, only few parts were translated. 
The interviews were recorded with two separate devices, a phone and laptop in mitigation of losing 
interview data. Some of the recordings were little disturbed with background noise, but this was 
temporary problem and mainly resulted in slower transcribing proses but might have also affected 
interpretations of individual sentences when writing the interviews. One interview had few unclear 
parts that were later confirmed with the interviewee and adjusted accordingly. However, 12 
recordings were mainly extremely clear and easy to transcribe and in the respect of the findings this 
couldn’t have affected them. The interviews were uploaded to a program called Cielo24 at 
www.cielo24.com. The service machine transcribed the interviews. However, the transcriptions 
were only partially useful as the program wasn’t very sophisticated and the interviews included a lot 
of pronunciation and grammar mistakes. The shortest face-to-face interview of 49 minutes took an 
additional 12 hours to transcribe and edit. An average transcribed interview was 10 pages long with 
around 5900 words in it when accounting for all the 14 interviews. The average of 12 face-to-face 
interviews were 14 pages long with around 7700 words in it. A more detailed information of the 
interviews can be seen from Table 7. 
Table 6, Interview details of the case companies 
 
Own creation.  
Code Interview date Interview length Interview method Title of the interviewee
Case 1 11/15/2018 130min Face-to-face meeting CEO, Co-founder
Case 2 11/7/2018 53min Face-to-face meeting CEO, Co-founder
Case 3 11/8/2018 62min Face-to-face meeting COO, Co-founder, Chairman of the Board
Case 4 11/9/2018 70min Face-to-face meeting CEO, Co-founder
Case 5 11/12/2018 65min Face-to-face meeting CEO, Co-founder
Case 6 11/12/2018 82min Face-to-face meeting Co-founder, Chairman of the Board
Case 7 11/15/2018 74min Face-to-face meeting CEO
Case 8 11/5/2018 66min Face-to-face meeting CEO
Case 9 11/15/2018 49min Face-to-face meeting Head of Innovation
Case 10 11/16/2018 57min Face-to-face meeting CEO
Case 11 11/16/2018 92min Face-to-face meeting Head of Digital
Case 12 12/3/2018 25min Email, voice recording COO, Co-founder
Case 13 11/9/2018 non-applicaple Email, written reply Lead Designer, Co-founder
Case 14 11/8/2018 57min Face-to-face meeting Group CEO, Co-founder, Member of the Board
INTERVIEW DETAILS
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3.5 Interview data analysis Analyzing the data was a long and complicated process. The data was analyzed thematically 
multiple times. First by following the interview guide themes, then surprising insights from the 
interviews, then organizing along and against literature review. While trying to build the cases and 
orders of coding many less fruitful combinations were attempted before the final form of 
interpretation of data started to appear. As more interviews were done some of them emerged as 
more fruitful than others and at times more weight was given on them instead of mutual weight on 
all cases. One of the applied coding was done by applying a simplified business model to give the 
data its structure. Later this structure evolved into two-layered theoretical framework representing 
the main coding of 14 interviews illustrated in figure 8.  
Figure 8, Research sample and its link towards building the framework 
 
Own creation.  
3.6 Planning complementary sample gathering 
Since there was one clear weakness in the interview sample as theoretical saturation wasn’t gained 
for Social Networking Sites through the 14 case samples, a need for additional data was identified. 
The companies identified as potential interview case companies for the study couldn’t close this 
knowledge gap as the companies left didn’t fit the SNS type. Hence, new primary data gathering 
was planned. As the focus of understanding business model had been identified with the first 
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sample, this knowledge was utilized in choosing a different data gathering setup as more 
appropriate. When conducting the interviews, it became evident that comparing these cases towards 
each other would be difficult due to the subjective experiences described by the interviewees. 
Moreover, gaining detailed and precise comments was challenging as the platform topic was 
relatively little known amongst the interviewed people. Thus, interviews were ruled out as the most 
appropriate data gathering method for the new data collection. The past literature classifying and 
grouping platforms were solely reliant on researcher’s judgement of the platform business model or 
understanding how it had evolved (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; 
Strowel & Vergote, 2016). Hence, the researcher decided to follow this method as well relying on 
own understanding of variety of platforms and their operating models to tap into more business 
cases of platform strategy.  
3.7 Testing platforms as a complimentary research method The selected method for new sample was based upon testing each platform’s user experiences by 
testing consumer version or free trial of each product. Before selecting suitable platforms for the 
sample, the researcher used some secondary data to assess the platform’s fit for the study. The 
secondary data utilized came from each platform’s website, LinkedIn profile and App Store profile. 
At times the researcher utilized some additional sources of secondary information, these are 
specified in the tables 7-9. 
While the focus of the new sample was to increase sample saturation with SNS, all the three 
platform types were kept in the scope of new primary data to see if deeper understanding could be 
gained. Simultaneously, the researcher aimed to address some additional weaknesses of the study 
by expanding the 1) cultural and geographical applicability of the sample by looking at the country 
of origin 2) the time horizon by looking at the initial release of the platform 3) the industry it 
operated in and the platform’s more 4) targeted focus area within the field. As a result, 70 platforms 
were tested and analyzed according to the two-layered theoretical framework. The selected 
platforms for the testing and their background information is displayed in the following three tables 
7,8 and 9. 
The testing of each platform was performed minimum of 3 hours with an average testing being 193 
hours. After the testing period the platform would be categorized according what value was offered 
and produced and how the user was able to tap into it and utilize it. This method would help the 
researcher to compare and classify platforms better from the same level playing field. As a result of 
this new sample gathering theoretical saturation was reached within all areas of the two-layered 
theoretical framework while confirming it to hold true. Moreover, settle differences were noted 
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among 70 platforms when they were grouped along the two-layered theoretical framework, thus 
forming a new third layer of differentiating factors among both the tested 70 platforms as well as 
previous 14 interviews confirming the new third layer as indicated in the analysis and findings 
chapter. Saturation was also reached within all 12 areas of this new improved three-layered 
theoretical framework. Simultaneously, improving the applicability of the model across industries, 
cultures and time horizon. Given this, the new improved three-layered theoretical framework seems 
to be accurate at least within the western world. 
Table 7, E-marketplace information and testing 
 
Own creation.  
  
Platform Owner Industry Focus Release Origin Testing Secondary source
Airbnb Airbnb, Inc. Lodging Vacation rental online marketplace 2008 USA <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Alibaba Alibaba Group E-commerce E-commerce, retail, Internet, and technology 1999 China <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Amazon Amazon.com, Inc. E-commerce
E-commerce, cloud computing, digital streaming, and artificial intelligence 1994 USA <10 hours
(Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
App Store Apple Inc. Digital distribution A digital distribution platform 2008 USA 10-49 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Boozt Boozt Online retailing Fashion and lifestyle products 2007 Sweden 50-100 hours
eBay eBay Inc. E-commerce E-commerce 1995 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Etsy Etsy E-commerce Handmade, vintage and custom items 2005 USA <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)Expedia Expedia Group Travelling service Online travel shopping 1996 USA 10-49 hours (Lang, 2015)Foodora Foodora Food Delivery Online food delivery 2014 Germany <10 hours
Groupon Groupon Inc. Online deal marketplace Connecting subscribers with local merchants 2008 USA <10 hoursHomeAway Expedia Group Travelling service A vacation rental marketplace 2004 USA <10 hours
Hotels.com Expedia Group Travelling accommodation service Booking hotel rooms online 1991 USA <10 hoursLyft Lyft Inc. Transportation Ridesharing company 2012 USA <10 hours (Edelman, 2015)
Momondo Booking Holdings Inc. Travelling service  Travel fare aggregator 2006 Denmark 10-49 hours
Skyscanner Skyscanner Holdings Travelling service Travel agency and metasearch engine 2001 UK 10-49 hours
Trivago Expedia Group Travelling service Hotel, lodging and metasearch fields 2005 Germany <10 hours
Uber Uber Technologies, Transportation Ride-hailing 2009 USA <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Videdressing Leboncoin groupe Reselling fashion Fashion community 2009 France 10-49 hours (Varza, 2012)
Wolt Wolt Enterprises Oy Food Delivery Food-delivery platform 2014 Finland <10 hours (Kauppalehti, 2019)
Zadaa Digital Fabric Oy Reselling fashion Helps people to buy and sell quality clothes 2015 Finland >100 hours (Kauppalehti, 2015)
Zalando Zalando SE Online retailing Fashion and lifestyle products 2008 Germany 50-100 hours
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Table 8, SaaS information and testing 
 
Own creation.  
  
Platform Owner Industry Focus Release Origin Testing Secondary source
Acrobat Adobe Inc. Computer software A PDF tool 1993 USA >100 hours (Jeday and Adobe Systems Inc., 1993; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Adblock Eyeo GmbH Internet Browser extension for content-filtering and ad blocking 2006 Germany <10 hours
Bitcoin Bitcoin Inc. Payment solution Electronic cash 2009 Japan <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Bernard, 2018)Box Box Cloud storage Cloud content management 2005 USA 10-49 hours (Mazarakis and Shontell, 2017)Chrome Google LLC Internet Web browser 2008 USA >100 hours
Creative Cloud Adobe Inc. Computer software Creative services 2011 USA <10 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Smith, 2020)
Dropbox Dropbox, Inc. Online backup service Smart workspace 2008 USA 50-100 hours (Gannes, 2009; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)Drive Google LLC Cloud computing File hosting service 2012 USA >100 hoursGmail Google LLC Webmail Email service 2004 USA >100 hours
HBO WarnerMedia Entertainment Entertainment Pay television network 1972 USA >100 hours
Illustrator Adobe Inc. Computer software A vector graphics editor 1987 USA 50-100 hours (Adobe Creative Cloud, 2014; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Internet Explorer Microsoft Corporation Internet Web browser 1995 USA >100 hours
LinkedIn Microsoft Corporation Internet Employment-oriented online service 2002 USA >100 hours
Netflix Netflix Inc. Tech & Entertainment Streaming media and video on demand 1997 USA >100 hours
Office Microsoft Corporation Software development Computer tools 1990 USA >100 hours (Microsoft, 1990)
Outlook Microsoft Corporation Software development A personal information manager 2006 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
PayPal PayPal Holdings, Inc. Financial services Online payments system 1998 USA <10 hours
Photoshop Adobe Inc. Computer software Graphics editor 1988 USA 10-49 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Shustek, 2019)
Safari Apple Inc. Internet Web browser 2003 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
SharePoint Microsoft Corporation Software development Document management and storage system 2001 USA >100 hours (Pilothouse Consulting, 2018)
Skype Microsoft Corporation Software development Videoconferencing tool 2003 Sweden >100 hours (BBC NEWS, 2005; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Slack Slack Technologies, Inc. Internet
Business communication platform 2013 USA 10-49 hours
Spotify Spotify Technology S.A.
Internet content and information Music streaming 2006 Sweden >100 hours (Yahoo! Finance, 2019)
Teams Microsoft Corporation Software development Chat-based workspace 2017 USA >100 hours (Microsoft, 2017)Trustpilot Trustpilot Inc. Internet Consumer review website 2007 Denmark <10 hours
Yahoo! Verizon Media Media A Web portal, search engine 1994 USA 10-49 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
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Table 9, SNS information and testing 
 
Own creation.  
  
Platform Owner Industry Focus Release Origin Testing Secondary source
CouchSurfing Couchsurfing International Inc. Internet Homestay and social networking service 2003 USA 10-49 hours
(New Hampshire Department of State, 2010)
Facebook Facebook Inc. Social media Social networking service 2004 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Flickr SmugMug, Inc. Social media Hosting high resolution photos 2004 Canada <10 hoursGoogle+ Google LLC Social media Social networking service 2011 USA <10 hours
Happn Happn Internet Geo-localized and real time dating app 2014 France >100 hours  (LinkedIn, 2019a)HappyPancake HappyPancake Internet Online dating service 2007 Sweden <10 hours (LinkedIn, 2019b)
IMDB Amazon.com, Inc. Internet Online database for movies, television and video games 1990 UK 50-100 hours (Chmielewski, 2013)
Instagram Facebook Inc. Social media Photo and video sharing social networking service 2010 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)OkCupid Match Group, Inc. Internet Online dating service 2004 USA 10-49 hours
Pinterest Pinterest Inc. Internet Image sharing and social media service 2009 USA >100 hoursPlenty of Fish Match Group, Inc. Internet Online dating service 2003 Canada <10 hoursReddit Advance Publications Mass media Social news aggregation 2005 USA <10 hours
Snapchat Snap Inc. Social media Person-to-person photo sharing 2011 USA 50-100 hours
Telegram Telegram Software A cloud-based instant messaging and voice over IP service 2013 Russia 10-49 hours
Tinder Match Group, Inc. Internet Geosocial networking and online dating application 2012 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Tumblr Automattic Inc. Internet Microblogging, social networking service 2007 USA <10 hours
Twitter Twitter Inc. Internet Microblogging and social networking 2006 USA 50-100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
WeChat Tencent Holdings Ltd. Instant messaging Instant messaging client 2011 China 50-100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
WhatsApp Facebook Inc. Internet Cross-platform messaging and Voice over IP 2009 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
WikiLeaks Sunshine Press Online media Publishes news leaks and classified media provided by anonymous sources 2006 Iceland <10 hours (Al Jazeera, 2010)
Wikipedia Wikimedia Foundation Internet Online encyclopedia 2001 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
Vivino Vivino Internet Online wine marketplace and wine app 2010 Denmark 50-100 hours
YouTube Google LLC Internet Online video-sharing platform 2005 USA >100 hours (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016)
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4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  This section presents findings regarding research question set for this study: what strategies 
platforms apply as they go in business and how they attempt to grow? The findings are heavily 
based on the interviews involving 14 representatives all from different companies. This data set has 
been accompanied by additional analysis of other well-known platform companies to test the model 
presented. Thus, this thesis proposes a theoretical framework to be applied when discussing 
platform strategies as illustrated in figure 9. While figure 9 captures the essence of the framework it 
is further elaborated in more details throughout the chapter of findings and analysis. 
4.1 Theoretical framework The theoretical framework introduced here, represents the key finding of the thesis describing what 
platform strategies companies use and how those can be clustered and separated from each other. 
The more detailed discussion of the different strategies and factors linked to each platform type are 
elaborated more in the following three chapters while the focus here is kept on introducing the 
framework on a higher level. Thus answering 1) what strategies platforms use in the launch and 2) 
what strategies platforms use when growing.  
Based on the analysis it is clear, that platform businesses do follow different strategies across their 
life cycle based on the platform type, their key target group as well as platform’s value offering. 
Based on the cases, there seem to be at least three mutually exclusive strategic focus areas platforms 
could utilize for their benefit when launching and growing their business and becoming e-
marketplace, software as a service or social networking site type platform. These platform types 
build their business models around six different distinguishable strategies that are 1) consumer 
driven e-marketplace, 2) business driven e-marketplace 3) independent software as a service users 
4) socially dependent software as a service users 5) information driven social networking site and 6) 
people driven social networking site. These categories are illustrated in figure 9.  
Figure 9, Platform business strategies divided into three main categories and 12 subcategories 
 
Own creation. 
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However, when moving beyond the interview analysis a more precise and profound strategy 
grouping was found, building yet another layer of depth to the analysis. This offers 12 unique 
platform strategies, based on the value offered by the minimum viable product (MVP) towards the 
platform’s key target group within three separate platform types. While e-marketplace platforms 
form their value closely tied to service or product offering and optimizing that, the other platform 
types have more nuanced value offering. 
Independent software as a service -users are catered value through standard or personalized 
offering. The latter might learn user preferences during its use or have different setups to adjust it 
according the need or the company might make the alterations for the individual while standard 
offering is the same for all. Socially dependent software as a service -users gain value by being 
connected to their personal social network or by being connected to any other users of the SaaS. 
Information driven social networking site creates value by creating primary data on its own, 
allowing its users to publish and produce content. Alternatively, the value is created by gathering 
secondary data in useful and helpful set up that serves platform users’ needs. People driven social 
networking site can provide value by connecting its users more efficiently with their existing social 
networks or by helping them to expand their social networks with new connections. 
Once the platform moves beyond building a minimum viable product and realizing more of its 
potential it expands its value proposition, often moving beyond its original key target group when 
seeking to scale. Thus, the platform’s strategic scope becomes wider. As the platforms move to 
bigger scope, they tend to expand horizontally focusing on the same value offering or vertically to 
expand how they create value. Simultaneously platforms’ need to consider do they need to drive 
engagement level with existing participants or to target new participants to engage with or both. 
Vertical expansion often means product and or service family, referred here as an offer family, 
having a variety of one or the other of both available to the customer. When this is the case a 
platform expands its value creation from 1/12 strategic areas into 2/12 strategic areas when seeking 
to engage more with old users as well as target new additional users to its platform as illustrated in 
figure 10. Hence representing one of the six platform strategies found based on the interviewed 
companies. Meaning gradual expansion of the initial strategy that the platform started with while 
being in line with the original one. Thus, the platform is able to offer more coherent value produced 
for the user and a set products or services that are tightly in lined with one another further producing 
positive network effects and hedging against current or potential competition by seeking to secure 
customers satisfaction with the platform. Although the company can expand its platform towards 
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any area expanding gradually tends to be less risky, more cost efficient and easiest to accomplish 
given the resources at the platform company’s exposal.  
Figure 10, Vertical expansion towards an offer family 
Own creation.  
As the company matures more and has been able to acquire more resources it might move on to the 
third state, seeking new growth by expansion as shown in figure 11. Here the company might seek 
to build a wider offer family by applying internal and external means. Partners and third parties can 
be very beneficial in expanding the offering without needing much more resources, capital or 
additional risk. However, as discussed in literature review these do challenge the company with 
other means and successful expansion with external parties is by no means easy. Despite this, 
network clustering and bridging might be worth the trouble as they can help the company towards a 
natural monopoly that is ultimately the goal for most platforms as it is most secure and profitable 
spot within the extremely competitive and difficult landscape as noted by Zhu and lansiti (2019) 
and Wan et al. (2017). While platforms mature and might seek new growth against their decline, 
they tend to stick with one of the six key target group covering 2/12 value offering areas. Even then, 
they rarely expand successfully outside their strategic umbrella being an e-marketplace, software as 
a service or social networking sites strategy, but stay within the limit of 4/12 value offerings. 
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Figure 11, Horizontal expansion as an alternative to vertical expansion strategy 
Own creation altered from Finance Institute (n.d.) 
Horizontal expansion tends to be more concerned with gaining new participants to the platform than 
vertically oriented ones that might have more room to engage existing participants to greater extent 
and capture new value there. This is true as horizontally expanding platforms seek to find new 
venues to gain added value from their current offering without expanding or changing it. Thus, they 
need to serve more users or customers via their platform. Meaning that platforms can grow their 
business also without expanding the offering as they can expand their own market. Market 
expansion can be done through many means as figure 11 illustrates three different plans for 
horizontal expansion focusing on single offer versus vertical expansion explained above. What the 
three horizontal expansion alternatives have in common is that they grow by acquiring more users 
whereas growing the offer family might just as easily mean growing the value served to the end-
user often translating to more engagements within the platform or more cash flow for the provider. 
Now obviously none of these things are exclusive. Companies can provide more value, increase 
their profits and expand both the time users spend on their platform and the number of users. While 
this thesis offers 12 vertical and three horizontal expansion strategies, platforms should always 
consider what gives them the best opportunity for growth prior making these decisions.  
4.2 E-marketplace The findings presented here in figures 12 and 13 rely heavily on the interviews of four 
organizations: Case 2, Case 6, Case 10 and Case 13. However, additional support is provided by 
some famous companies that also follow the described e-marketplace strategy: Airbnb, Alibaba, 
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Amazon, App Store, Boozt, eBay, Etsy, Expedia, Foodora, Groupon, HomeAway, Hotels.com, 
Lyft, Momondo, Skyscanner, Trivago, Uber, Videdressing, Wolt, Zadaa and Zalando. 
4.2.1 Offering 
The key differentiating feature between e-marketplace platforms and other platforms types is its 
focus on connecting supply and demand in an efficient way to make discovering, finding, 
comparing and trading both physical goods and services as simple and enjoyable as possible as 
illustrated in figure 12. Thus, these companies emphasize succeeding to reinforce positive network 
effects and connectivity as means to bring the different parties together.  
Figure 12, E-marketplace platform business strategies  
 
Own creation.  
Depending on the offering, e-marketplaces can be further divided into consumer or business driven 
models. These platforms seek to provide efficient way to find and search through multiple options 
by enhancing browsing experience through search engine optimization to offer faster, easier and 
more accurate results. Therefore, user experience is emphasized when designing and developing the 
e-marketplace. Moreover, as the e-marketplace grows the platform is likely to establish stricter rules 
and guidelines to promote trust and level of quality. Both the driving force of the e-marketplace as 
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well as the search engine optimization come together when designing the user experience. The 
platform owner tends to consider the entire journey from searching to purchasing and to delivering 
and follow-up. Completing this journey will give insight on how the experience is perceived and 
how it could be enhanced still. However, the key value this thesis offers for understanding further e-
marketplace concept is in its internal focus points and strategies dividing e-marketplaces to 
consumer and business driven ones explained in figure 13 and the following two chapters. 
Figure 13, E-marketplace division between consumer and business driven platforms 
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4.2.1.1 Consumer driven e-marketplace 
The consumer driven e-marketplaces tend to enable exchange between consumers. Meaning that 
exchanged goods and services are easily delivered, the ownership can change, providing these 
services and products don’t require a lot of rare knowledge and engagement in this market isn’t 
capital intensive. Thus, the market is easily reachable by many consumers and able to tap into their 
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offerings. While these markets start from the B2C side, they can later attract also B2B side to offer 
alternative services or products for the existing users. However, this development is linked to 
growing the market and it isn’t linked to the MVP of the e-marketplace. Examples of B2C side 
MVP services are carpooling, renting an apartment or selling used goods. One of the keys in 
attracting masses is embedded in the fact that anyone can benefit and become part of the exchange 
as supplying or receiving these goods don’t seem to acquire a specialization and can be offered by 
most of the population. The early adopters tend to be consumers and small business owners that 
might use the e-marketplace as alternative sales channel for their offering. Some of the e-
marketplaces that have used this operating model are businesses like AirBnB, Facebook 
Marketplace, Zadaa, Videdressing and case examples of Case 2 and Case 10. The consumer-driven 
market might be able to use social networks for their benefit as they may offer incentives for 
individuals to attract their own networks to join as well. Zadaa has done this via subsidizing. They 
gave free credits for users who were able to attract new users to use their platform and gave 
simultaneous discount to the new joiner in free credits. This way they stimulated both usage and 
gaining new attraction to the platform. 
Case 2 is an example of consumer-driven e-marketplace. It has been able to successfully gain market share and attract sellers to their e-marketplace by utilizing existing channels to access buyers. Their sales items are further posted to existing and competing online aggregator websites, that compile data 
on offered items. Thus, the company don’t need to attract demand on their own but can focus on attracting suppliers. While the potential buyer might find the product from a third-party website it has been posted on, the sale happens on the company’s website, that the customer has been redirected to. The company attracts new suppliers via friend referrals, Facebook, Google and other paid adds like the once on TV and busses. This is essential as new suppliers are key to their business model as they are in business with little reoccurrence. 
4.2.1.2 Business driven e-marketplace 
The business-driven e-marketplace tends to provide an alternative sales channel for the companies 
involved to better reach their customers. The rationale is same as for brick and mortar stores that 
locate themselves in close distance from their competitors to enable convenient comparison for 
potential buyers of the competing offerings and prices in shopping centers and industrial areas etc. 
Similarly, consumers are drawn to business-driven e-marketplaces as they have a need they wish to 
be fulfilled with as good, conveniently and effortlessly as possible. As the offerings are mainly 
served by businesses, they tend to be more sophisticated, specialized or complex goods requiring 
specialization in the industry and front investments for being able to offer the good or service. This 
explains why they are almost solely offered by B2B providers. Examples could be made from 
multiple industries like aviation, hotels, beauty services or fine dining provided by companies like 
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Amazon, Skyscanner, Momondo, Expedia and Groupon as well as case examples of Case 13, Case 
3, Case 6 and Case 11.  
The business-driven market might be able to draw data from other providers within the field and 
aggregate it in a meaningful way that creates value for the consumer. This can mean that the e-
marketplace appears to have a lot of suppliers when in fact they are operating as a middleman only 
showing offerings from other webstores making orders or redirecting clients in case of a purchase is 
made. This kind of model may be applied before the e-marketplace gains the actual interest and 
attention of the suppliers. When done well these platforms might grow fast, however there is a real 
risk of gaining bad reputation if done poorly. Ottega is one of many cases where the company has 
received negative reputation for operating in this way. They offer cheap jewelry products originally 
sold in Alibaba and other webstores. However, the real reason for dissatisfied clients might be 
behind insufficient communication, little transparency of the operations and pricing as well as 
difficulties in delivering the goods fast and reliably. Case 6 is a company, that started by attracting 
B2B side before moving to B2C. Their business model is shortly explained below.  
Case 6 is an example of business-driven e-marketplace. It is a company that is based upon discovering 
new things on a niche area. Hence, their target audience covers everyone within the niche and doesn’t separate between B2B and B2C sides. Due to the limited offering, their key customers are small players with little reoccurrence making new customer essential for survival in their selected business model. While the company focuses on dense areas like cities, they are keen to cover all areas viable for business. 
4.2.1.3 Balanced e-marketplace 
While e-marketplaces tend to cater both B2B and B2C user groups. The business might start as a 
consumer- or business-driven e-marketplace but grow overtime to become a more balanced e-
marketplace, where it’s harder to differentiate the original focus. Meaning, that the supplier side is 
compiled of both B2B and B2C users as might the demand side be a mixture of consumer and 
businesses. Some of the companies, that are currently more balanced e-marketplaces are Amazon, 
Alibaba, eBay, AirBnB and case examples of Case 6 and Case 10. However, if the e-marketplace 
attempts to cater a balanced e-marketplace from the day one, it is more complicated and often 
require heavy subsidizing on both sides to succeed as Edelman (2015) described earlier with a Lyft 
case. 
The more balanced between multiple parties an e-marketplace is, the more difficult balancing 
interest between groups become. If the platform has only one key target group, the decision making 
is simpler as there are no colliding interests among target groups. Also, multiple sides don’t need to 
be equally satisfied to sustain an e-marketplace. Whereas a balanced e-marketplace should always 
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aim for a win-win solution, benefiting all parties equally. Thus, succeeding in a balanced e-
marketplace platform strategy requires extreme insight into different parties’ preferences and needs 
as the platform evolves. Balancing between decisions on which side of the market will be served 
better when developing or resolving incidents and understanding which party can be compromised 
more on each occasion is an essential skill for an e-marketplace provider. While solving a single 
decision a platform owner should have clear focus on the holistic outcome by creating value for all 
sides to sustain all parties interest to stay on a balanced e-marketplace strategy. 
4.2.1.4 Orchestrating sales through e-marketplaces Building a great user experience includes multiple steps. Within e-marketplaces these can be 
divided between pre-sale, sale and after sale activities. Pre-sales include 1) discovery, 2) access, 3) 
login and 4) discount. Sales include 5) search, 6) display, 7) chat, 8) order and 9) payment. Lastly, 
after sales include 10) distribution, 11) feedback and 12) engagement. These 12 steps serve a 
specific function that aims to optimize the usage and user experience of the e-marketplace while 
encouraging its usage. Companies may use only some of the steps along the process or even change 
the order. However, these are rather usual steps, displayed in a common order of engaging 
experience. These steps are further discussed below as well as illustrated within figure 14. 
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Figure 14, E-marketplace user experiences 
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Pre-sale starts with 1) discovery, that refers for users need to be aware of the service. To enhance 
the awareness the company may invest into search engine optimization (SEO) that will increase its 
visibility when searching through the topic on a search engine with a browser like Explorer, 
Chrome, Firefox and Safari. This will help the service gain new visitors that might convert into 
users. Then users need to be able to 2) access it easily. Meaning enabling convenient usage via 
virtual application, online service, access by downloading the service or similar fast and remote 
access to the platform. Easy access may improve the conversion of new visitors towards users just 
like difficulty in accessing the service is likely to hinder usage. Many of the providers have noted 
the importance of focusing on mobile experience as smartphone application usage might be more 
convenient or desirable for some service types. Due to this development some e-marketplace 
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providers start from building the mobile version and may expand the usage later towards desktop 
experience while the traditional way has been the opposite. The provider needs to ensure the users 
will start using the service after accessing it. Some decide not to require immediate 3) login and 
creating an account, as they want to lower the barrier for new users to join and see first if the 
service provides enough value for them to create an account. Some have chosen to enable third 
party identification through Facebook, Google or similar to make joining the service faster, 
potentially more appealing and removing the need to create a new profile. As part of the login and 
creating an account many e-marketplaces enable connecting the account to a 4) discount code. The 
platform might suggest inviting friends to join the e-marketplace in exchange for discount for both 
the user and new joiner or for one of them. These discounts are made to encourage new users to try 
the service for free or with a discount. 
All e-marketplaces need an effective 5) search engine, filters or groups to scroll through the 
offering. Building this is both extremely difficult and demanding but also a major part of the value 
offered by the e-marketplace. Most companies seem to use a combination of filters and or groups 
and a search bar. Additionally, many have turned into machine learning in terms of trying to predict 
and suggest offerings for the user based on user’s previous behavior. Hence making the usage of the 
e-marketplace ever more effortless to the user.  
While discovering the offering is important the way it is 6) displayed is at least as important. Thus, 
building good minimum requirements for providers on how to display and describe the offerings is 
recommended. This will ease comparing offerings, build transparency, trust and improve the value 
of the offerings as enough information is shared easily. The e-marketplace provider has an incentive 
to do this as their offering is only as valuable as the offerings served through them. Many 
companies build rather in-detailed profile formats with specific questions, photo slots, categories to 
be selected as well as delivery and price details. The format helps the provider to build appealing 
and informative offerings with the intention to minimize additional information requests and other 
complications that might slow the buying process. These facilitate the immediate buying option, 
allowing the consumer to make a fast decision whether to buy.  
Even if good rules and enforcement of display information are in place many want to offer 
additional communication channel that facilitates communication between the seller and potential 
buyers connecting them in 7) chat. This might allow the potential buyer to gather additional detail 
about the product, haggle and negotiate terms of the deal. The e-marketplace platform may provide 
both public and or private discussion forums to facilitate these needs. Moreover, contact 
information might be shared on these chats to enabling the actual meetup, purchase, review or 
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return of good between the parties. While a chat may bring added trust towards the platform and 
towards its users, it can also create a risk of disintermediation (Zhu & lansiti, 2019) for the platform 
owner. This happens, if the chat is not monitored or executed well and the parties can bypass the e-
marketplace to avoid paying the platform fees or to connect by other means.  
The most important face of e-marketplace is 8) ordering. As it defines whether the marketplace can 
deliver its minimum value. Thus, most e-marketplaces have an instant purchase option available, 
that enables fast instant closing of a deal without a single interaction with the seller. Next comes 9) 
payment, that is the last step of closing the sale. As people tend to be careful with payments, many 
platforms have selected a reputable third-party solution and integrated it instead of creating their 
own payment solution. Some common options are e-payment solutions like PayPal, credit cart 
providers like Visa, Mastercard or a Mobile payment provider. Moreover, some of these e-
marketplaces don’t simply transfer the money once order is made but hold onto it until the buyer 
has collected the good and confirmed a successful delivery. This builds trust towards the platform, 
instead of the individual players, and can be better controlled by the platform. Alternatively, some 
e-marketplaces partner up with multiple players to offer many payment solution options to make the 
experience more convenient and seamless for the users. 
After payment starts the last part, after-sales. This includes 10) distribution, that either brings 
parties together to exchange goods, to deliver the service or brings the product or service to the 
buyer. At times the buyer and the seller meet in real life, but often another third-party solution has 
been utilized to deliver ordered goods. This can be a global or local player that delivers packages or 
a postal office. E-marketplaces seldom offer their own solution, but rather might partner up with 
one or multiple players to make the experience more enjoyable and seamless for the users.  
Once the buyer has received the good, 11) feedback is gathered. Usually feedback is gathered from 
the buyer, but often also from the seller. As both parties rate, star and comment each other, the 
feedback is sent to the system for internal improvement purposes as well as to give visibility for 
other platform actors on the reliability of these actors. Some platforms let the users choose whether 
to share the reviews publicly and others are predefined. Additionally, some e-marketplaces are more 
persistent on collecting the feedback from all interactions than others. While enabling feedback 
seems to build trust within a platform and among its users, depending on its execution, it can make 
the results look extremely skewed. For instance, Facebook only enables rating users through its 
official E-marketplace, although a major part of deals they facilitate are exchanged on its groups 
and chats. Moreover, it shows individuals how they have been reviewed by the other party before 
giving a feedback to them. This kind of lack of confidentiality is likely to turn feedback between 
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parties more alike with one another. Zadaa is another example that skews the feedback results by 
denying any feedback when an item has been cancelled, returned, lost or given additional discount 
after the original purchase. Hence, only satisfied or rather satisfied users can contribute to the 
platform’s public feedback system on other users.  
The last step is 12) engagement. It seeks to ensure reoccurring usage of the e-marketplace by 
engaging the users. This can be similar to the fourth step offering a discount in exchange of 
engagement. Many e-marketplaces have connected user accounts to a discount code that will be 
enabled in exchange of inviting friends to the e-marketplace. These discounts might be connected to 
newly joined friends, or purchases they make within the e-marketplace. Some offer benefits only 
the user, others for both the user and new joiner. These discounts are made to encourage new users 
to try the service for free or with a discount by spreading it via trusted network connection. 
Additionally, these might help to lock-in the current users as they gain benefits when being more 
involved with it. 
4.2.2 Client and user 
When it comes to user and client engagement, the e-marketplace platforms put more emphasis on 
few additional factors that might help or hinder the adaptation and growth of the platform among its 
users. One of these is catering needs within a local or global market. Some e-marketplaces expand 
their market offering while others keep a more limited focus and expand through locations. As most 
e-marketplaces are tied to physical limits on the location through their offering, they often need to 
have a delivery system in place to support their business, which can further distinguish them as 
local or global e-marketplaces. These and other differentiating factors are further highlighted in 
figure 15. 
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Figure 15, Global and local e-marketplace focus points 
 
Own creation. 
4.2.2.1 Local e-marketplace 
Local services, that are physically consumed don’t require similar in-build e-marketplace 
reassurance of reliability and trust due to physical contact to the place and ease of communication 
and ability to complain if needed. Even if the e-marketplace sells products, the local ones have the 
benefit of operating under common language, law and region. These realities alone enable these e-
marketplaces to put their efforts on different factors. These focus points for local e-marketplaces are 
likely to evolve around density, facilitating local preference and ability to offer both services and 
products. Hence, e-marketplaces with a local focus can’t transport their business model as easily to 
a new location. Because of it, they tend to innovate on how to expand the product and service 
family to cover new areas with additional partners instead of moving across countries and 
continents.  
Case 10’s target users in B2C side are people who have a surplus or a good they wish to sell or users who wish to purchase a good or a good and service via their platform. The company identifies their users to be hybrid consumers that might or might not engage with their services depending on a variety of things. Over the B2B side the target customers include companies varying between anyone who wants to sell, buy, advertise or provide services and solutions in combination with the platform provider. This said the company targets all businesses from small to big corporations who are interested in being involved or wants to be part of exchanging of good and present when people buy goods. The 
Global market
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Cost of maintaining
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company operates solely in a local market and plans to expand via products and service offering instead of global reach.  
When making these e-marketplaces efficient they tend to focus their service offerings within bigger 
cities to have enough density among providers and consumers of a particular location. When 
density is crucial factor, an e-marketplace tends to expand from city to city selecting dense areas for 
it to flourish. While density can be a useful factor for many to consider, it is crucial for some of the 
service offerings like carpooling, restaurants and beauty salons since their offerings make only 
sense if the users can access these easily. Examples of companies offering these are Case 13 and 
Case 3. While density can be beneficial to local e-marketplaces there are sets of services that don’t 
require similar geographical proximity with the users such as spas, holiday offerings, concerts and 
other cultural activities that aren’t necessarily consumed on a regular basis, but might be tied to an 
event, holiday or special treat. Example on a company offering this is Case 6. 
Case 6’s target audience covers both B2B and B2C sides. Weather, or not the buyer is B2B or B2C the 
company targets anyone seeking for a new space. As the company doesn’t handle any other event producing services this tends to limit the userbase into smaller players and non-reoccurring events mainly. However, the company supports all segments of space renting business. Although, the segment of discovering new spaces is rather small the company targets masses within that segment. Afterall, most people wish to rent out a space few times in their life for birthdays, weddings, sauna evenings and 
other social gatherings. This said the company’s target group is people who organize gatherings in new places and especially in cities. Within the space provider side, B2B the company targets all spaces nationally again targeting bigger cities more. The size of the provider or the type of the offered location 
doesn’t matter. The company hasn’t limited the offering further, as the market for discovering new spaces would be too small if only focused on single segment of the business, like weddings. 
4.2.2.2 Global e-marketplace 
Globally oriented e-marketplaces tend to put more emphasis on building a trusted solution, having 
global reach, supporting multiple languages, having a good delivery system and its network, having 
reliable payment solution, having support of legal knowledge and ability to offer products. While 
global orientation might support local languages, laws and culture they need more organizing 
efforts to do so. The more the platform involves consumers the more important language support 
might be, meaning translating the service to each country the e-marketplace operates in.  
Similarly, it is important to build trust and goodwill with the local authorities and not to ignore the 
local legislation when it relates to their operations. Both AirBnB and Uber have faced consequences 
of their acts violating the local law. While some of the industries have more legal boundaries 
guiding their industry, it’s good to be aware what legislation requires from operating in that 
particular field. Additionally, some platforms might have to adjust their operations of offering for 
local preferences instead of copying them per se. Thus, involving both local suppliers and buyers 
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might be important for optimal outcome when accounting and adjusting according to local 
preferences. 
Consequently, having more focus points can also become more costly. Thus, global e-marketplace’s 
operating cost might become high, unless they can push their costs to other players or dominate the 
market. A user develops perceptions of both the provider as well as suppliers and clients on the 
platform. Since globally oriented e-marketplaces cater variety of goods, they tend to play with price 
and variety and win customers with these variables. Thus, this can lead to lower level of loyalty 
between the actual seller and buyer shown as one- or few-time interactions instead of reoccurring 
purchases. When this is true, new buyers and investing into attracting them becomes more essential, 
which tends to be also more difficult and time consuming than creating reoccurring sales.   
When an e-marketplace expands, it becomes even more important to have well established service 
logic, development tools, rules, guidelines and monetization logic, that covers all the parties 
involved providing a clear and transparent distribution of cashflow as well as other legal matters 
like IPRs. Unless the platform provider takes care of these, the platform will face increasingly 
negative network effects as they grow. More importantly, the reliability and user experience might 
turn worse. For instance, Apple’s App Store is trying to mitigate unreliable applications by 
facilitating user ratings, comments, reviewing apps themselves and applying more restricted rules 
and guidelines towards the suppliers. Additionally, they choose to promote some of the reliable 
apps they have identified themselves. The quality aspect is essential for the platform provider as 
their service is only as good as the offerings they cater. Meaning that each profile matters, whether 
the profile is good it will shape the user experience just as if there are unreliable partners the 
perception of the entire e-marketplace and its provider can change radically fast. While securing 
good quality throughout the service is tricky it is also essential piece of building trust as good 
quality and standards build trust towards the e-marketplace as well as towards individuals in the 
platform. Trust plays an even bigger role, when the buyer takes a risk, like ordering a product across 
globe and paying a delivery fee even if the product will be returned.  
4.2.3 Monetization model 
Most of the e-marketplace monetization models evolve around taking a small percentage of sold 
goods the rest of the money goes to the provider. Additional small amounts might go to the 
payment system provider, a delivery provider or the e-marketplace might have an additional fee for 
suppliers to be able to take part in it. The percentage of sold goods seem to vary depending on the 
amount spend, the smaller amount each purchase is the likelier the percentage fee is bigger. 
However, this depends also on the power the platform provider has within the market. A strong 
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player with a natural monopoly is more likely to ask for bigger percentage for itself or to have 
additional payments like setup fees of monthly subscription for being able to provide its offering via 
the e-marketplace. An example of this is provided by Case 6. When the e-marketplace wasn’t as 
established it didn’t charge for the setup, but now as the e-marketplace has attracted more supply 
and demand suppliers are willing to pay for the involvement. 
Case 6 has multiple revenue streams and revenue channels. The main income comes through the e-marketplace as people purchase good via the platform. That is the commission revenue coming from B2C users ultimately. That is the commission they take from every sale that goes through the e-marketplace. That’s around 10 per cent of the cost of the space for the buyer. However, they offer the event organizers a free service to help them find and select a potential space. The organizers can access the service via chat. On the B2B side, the company takes a small set up fee, when a new venue wants to get listed into the platform. At the beginning they offered a free trial version, but now they always 
charge a setup fee, that’s around few hundred euros. That includes, consultation and helping the client to set up the profile and to help them to improve the profile. A second stream of separate income comes from B2B side only as the company offers advertising space. This is extra visibility from newsletter or 
the landing page. So, it’s kind of premium version for the suppliers, extra visibility for a limited time or the whole year that few clients buy.  
One of the distinctive features of platform tend to be that they operate a freemium model in a way 
meaning that B2C side doesn’t pay for the involvement unless they purchase a good via the 
platform. Even then the platform might be completely free for the B2C user, however in those cases 
the platform operator is most likely not involved in the transaction, handling any of the payments or 
delivery system via the e-marketplace. An example of this kind of operating model in illustrated by 
Case 10.  
Case 10 monetization model is divided into three main categories depending on the target audience. They offer a freemium model for B2C experience. Alternatively, B2C users can purchase better visibility for their offerings via single payments accessing a premium version of the service. These solutions cost few euros. The second group being on the B2B side is served via subscription-based model. The company offers different bundled offerings for advertising credits via monthly fee. These target the small and local business owners. Lastly for big corporations they have a variety of different solutions that can be extremely customized like co-operating with a mobile payment solution to build better payment experiences for the e-marketplace users or better delivery system with purchase tracking. However, the company offers also simple advertising space from its web site. This may cost 
as little as 0,1€.  
E-marketplaces tend to be rather capital intense business models as they seek to target masses, 
subsidize involvement and take long to showcase a sustainable business model. Subsidizing 
involvement is often used to lower the cost of joining a platform, it might also indicate an early 
phase of the business as new users are providers are subsidized most heavily in the beginning when 
there are only little users. This subsidizing is often linked to trying the service for the first time or 
inviting other to the platform via social channels. Companies like Uber, Foodora, Wolt and Zadaa 
use these methods. Other companies seek the same effect by offering special discounted deals, 
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lower prices or cheaper options for traditional goods. Case 3’s e-marketplace offers discounted 
prices if bought through the e-marketplace. Similarly, Momondo, Skyscanner, Expedia, Groupon 
and Boozt have provided lower prices to drive their business. Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, Uber and 
AirBnB try to offer cheaper alternatives for the goods. This model is also used by Case 2, Case 10 
and Case 13 that have found alternative ways to satisfy the same need with potentially cheaper 
production cost. Case 13 sells food waste, Case 10 used goods and Case 2 has been able to produce 
the original service through modern techniques at a much lower cost. As the cost of good is lower, 
the market tends to expand as some of the previously unsatisfied needs are now met.  
Case 2’s key benefit is tied to the price of their service as they are around 5 to 6 times cheaper than a traditional realtor. Investing into a technology that can optimize and automate thigs has enabled them to offer the service extremely cost effectively. However, it also creates pressure as they need to be at least 6 times more efficient to afford smaller cut. The company takes 0,75% commission of all the sold flats. 
The company doesn’t take any fee from payment or other payments attached to the service. This 
approach has also helped them to attract users are there aren’t financial risks involved. On the hindsight, they believe that the commission could have been little higher, having a price point at 0,95% or so, that would help them reach profitability little earlier.  
4.3 Software as a Service  The key differentiating feature between Software as a Service (SaaS) and other platforms types is 
its focus on improving efficiency and automating back-office functions on cloud services as 
illustrated in figure 16.  
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Figure 16, Software as a Service platform strategies 
 
Own creation.  
The findings presented here in figures 16 and 17 rely heavily on the interviews of six organizations: 
Case 3, Case 4 B2B side, Case 5 B2B side, Case 7, Case 8, Case 12. However, additional support is 
provided by some famous companies that also follow the described SaaS strategy: Acrobat, 
Adblock, Bitcoin, Box, Chrome, Creative Cloud, Dropbox, Drive, Gmail, HBO, Illustrator, Internet 
Explorer, LinkedIn, Netflix, Office, Outlook, PayPal, Photoshop, Safari, SharePoint, Skype, Slack, 
Spotify, Teams, Trustpilot and Yahoo! 
4.3.1 Offering 
Software as a Service (SaaS) refers to a platform model, where the platform focuses on improving 
efficiency and automating back-office functions. These are often sold as a technical solution that 
modernized old ways of doing things, such as digitizing and automating functions through a cloud 
service. These enable easy access regardless of the user’s device and location. However, the key 
value this thesis offers for understanding further SaaS concept is in its internal focus points and 
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strategies dividing SaaS to independent users and socially dependent users based on the initial 
driving force of the platform as explained in figure 17 and the following chapters.  
Figure 17, SaaS division between independent user and socially dependent user platforms 
 
Own creation.  
4.3.1.1 Socially network dependent SaaS 
When SaaS provides access for multiple users simultaneously improving its users experience and 
value tied to the SaaS service its key target group can be described as socially dependent user 
group. What this can mean is that the services seek to improve coworking possibilities and 
supporting virtual teams as the SaaS added value to its users. These are essential functions when 
sharing within one’s own network provides the offered value. Services like Skype, Slack, Google 
Gmail, Outlook, Microsoft Teams and SharePoint follow this service logic. This changes both how 
the platform is used but also how the service spreads around. When new users are socially 
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dependent on their networks they tend to engage and convince others to join the SaaS. This can be 
great from the platform owner’s perspective as the users have intrinsic motivation to grow the user 
network.  
A SaaS company typically seeks to offer stand-alone value, that is its most effective way of gaining 
new users without attachments to other users or parties involved. When seeking stand-alone value, 
the company tends to focus on a key problem and seeks to build as minimalistic solution as possible 
following an MVP (Minimum Viable Product) model. Traditionally SaaS platforms seek to build a 
fast-proven MVP and business concept first to a carefully selected industry niche. MVP is the basis 
of the SaaS, a simple solution. The biggest part of the offering is however often built on top of the 
MVP. These are complementary offerings that make the MVP solution even better. They may 
provide extensions, more functionality and allow more personalized services according to the needs. 
These complementary services are often the more sophisticated parts of the offering that bring a lot 
of additional value for the user. The company might expand the services provided by building a 
network of partners that can further improve and extend the original service or to enhance the sales 
of the innovation. The importance of partner network expands as the innovation matures. This 
expansion might also happen under a different business logic or expand the current platform 
strategy. A great example of this is Case 7 as the company has a very clear MVP by sending mobile 
payments but has been able to build massive amount of value on top of that by innovative solution 
within its network of clients and partners. This has been rather difficult as socially dependent SaaS 
are more complex and difficult to organize than independent SaaS services. This is mainly due the 
fact that network effects are essential in this model as the value of the service is tied to user’s own 
network being connected to the service.   
Case 7 is a mobile payment solution targeting masses on its B2C market across different Nordic countries offering as convenient, easy and good solution as possible. The original goal was to make mobile payments as easy as sending a text message, which it has reached. Unlike many SaaS the 
company’s primary focus is to succeed in B2C market having B2B efforts as secondary. The company believes this to require heavy from investments but drawing B2B side towards itself once they have 
gained enough users. The company’s B2B focus is within merchants to negotiate their payment solution as a new acceptable instore payment solution. The company promises their clients in B2B side, to offer 
better customer experience for the merchants’ customers. The third focus is to build partner network that will enable smooth and easy payments for B2C, for this the company has been cooperating with banks to make them accept its payment solution and to support it. Although, the business model has been established as well as the MVP, the company is constantly innovating and trying new solutions as 
facilitating their own clients’ needs the company needs to be rather agile and innovative. They have 
built multiple different solutions around merchants’ instore payment applications as well as how to connect all the needed parties with another to form as simple, convenient and good payment solution for the end-user.  
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4.3.1.2 Socially dependent SaaS on any user 
Alternatively, some SaaS are dependent on any users. These are services, where people engage 
based on activity like searching for a job or reviewing a product. Companies that follow this model 
are LinkedIn, Trustpilot, Bitcoin and Case 4 B2B side.  
The more complex and unique blue ocean or technology spearhead the SaaS is the more resources 
teaching the customer is likely to require as well as to hinder the spread and adaptation of the 
service. Being a first mover isn’t necessarily an advantage and markets might not be ready. This 
explains why most of the innovation tends to recombine old and new exploiting temporary 
advantages in the market to improve onboarding and selling the service instead seeking to provide 
completely radical blue ocean innovation. This doesn’t mean that the companies wouldn’t be 
disrupting the markets, but rather highlighting the mixture of old and new technologies combined in 
the solution. (Hackling, 2013) Case 4 B2B side is an example of how simply recombining old 
technology and offering it to an industry niche a company may find its value. The company’s 
solutions operate on top of public and private chat systems, something that has been around for 
long. However, they want to build a very simple, easy to use and great application for mobile users 
specifically. The company is dependent on users willing to engage in the platform in order to 
provide value for the buyer. Interestingly, the buyer of the service has always internal stake to 
enhance communicating and engaging with others making them invest into finding enough people 
to use the service. This has released the case company 4 from the potentially difficult situation of 
providing multisided engagement. 
Case 4 has created a communication service that is used by B2B and B2C side. The company started from B2C, but has now moved more and more towards B2B, as the market is more lucrative there. The B2B side is still rather new business side for the company and they are still testing and developing the business model. However, their MVP that is the light social forum has been tested. Currently the company makes small adjustments and additional functions on the B2B side the company operates a 
SaaS business model that builds forums inside their client’s networks and operating systems selling for all kinds of organizations that wish to connect with internal or external groups. The offering in the B2B side is to make best possible discussion forum for smartphone usage that enable long-term engagement and support long discussions. The focus is to be light, easy to use and fast to implement, but also to easy to exit the deal. As they want organizations to have very low barrier to try and use their service. The company measures their success on B2B side by following how many people are contacted and turned into meetings and further convert into clients. On the B2C side the company connect anonymous profiles with each other and with mentors. The goal is to enable uses to get help easily and without any fear of social stigma. The key is how well the users find the service, how well can the service connect and help the users to find mentors to help them and how easy it is to pay inside the service. The 
company collects data on what kind of groups people are involved in and who’s paying for what services. The company measures the conversion rate for payable customers and has set the target between 2,5% and 5%. The current difficulties lie within how well the company could facilitate and improve network effects as well as to find reliable partners for the operations in Asia. The company 
believes that B2B platform is easier in the beginning and doesn’t require as much investments. 
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However, the B2C side takes longer and more investments to brake trough, but if it does it and starts to scale it will be much more valuable business. 
4.3.1.3 Independent personalized SaaS offering 
A more traditional branch or SaaS is independent users that aren’t reliant on network effects 
providing value. Rather they need to simply gain access and learn how to use the program, making 
it more simple business model whether the offering is standard or personalized. Personalized SaaS 
offers include companies like HBO, Netflix, Chrome, Internet Explorer, Safari. These learn the 
induvial preferences of the user and can potentially differentiate multiple users from each other. 
They tend to make the service experience smoother for the end-user in comparison to standard 
offerings.  
All of the SaaS offerings are typically built through modularity, meaning independent modules that 
can be combined in different ways to produce different services. This enables the company to offer 
differently packaged goods for different target groups expanding offering, customer groups and 
price points supported. Different readily made packages combine the offerings into valuable 
bundles for potential customers to make the solutions more approachable, customized, convenient 
and easy to sell. Bundles are done through minimal efforts as combining modules is effective way 
to support different customer groups and even to provide customization. These packages can be 
offered solely by the company or in combination with partners or third-party providers. Great 
examples of modularity are Case 8, Case 4 B2B side and Case 5 B2B side. All of these three 
companies offer more customized products via modularity. This is especially valuable for Case 5 
B2B side as the buyer and the user are far apart mitigating for the potential of misunderstanding and 
enabling the user to shape the service experience a lot on their own. Simultaneously, it’s the only 
interviewed SaaS offering that is personalized and sold independently, meaning that it diversifies its 
offer little like Netflix or Chrome based on the behavioral pattern the service has learned during 
earlier encounters. 
Case 5 helps people go from knowledge learning to behavioral change and forming lasting habits. “The value proposition is to offer knowledge workers coaching at scale. The focus is to build new routines 
around stress reduction and smart work habits and high performance.” The company provides programs and coaching for both individuals and companies. Essentially all the users access the same platform and programs. However, the experiences are different and the focus in heavily in the B2B side. All the B2B customers enter the service through a different way first having a kick-off webinar or seminar and then going to a separate landing page completing a survey before accessing any programs. After they have started the journey the company takes responsibility of engaging them for the two-month period that the coaching lasts and help the users to form and make lasting positive micro-changes around 1 to 3 topics of their own choosing. The B2B customers have more personalized view and access for coaching that 
isn’t available for B2C users. These coaches monitor the progress and can comment and intervene the programs in real-time. The B2C experience highlights peer-support, sharing, content creation, 
collective empowerment and innovation. The users don’t simply do programs, but they can share their 
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experience along the program and talk to one another. In many cities these people have formed actual communities that meet in real life as well. The company measures their success mainly through how well they reduce users stress and improve their wellbeing. Another metrics that they follow include how many people enter programs, what kind of products are chosen and how many complete these programs. These are collected mainly through surveys and usage data. 
4.3.1.4 Independent standard SaaS offering 
Standard SaaS offerings are offerings that appear always the same for everyone. Meaning, that the 
value it produces to its users won’t become greater if they personalize it or they gain more attraction 
to the service via other users or the added value is moderate. Companies that belong to this group 
are Microsoft Office, Adobe, Salesforce, PayPal, Shopify and Adblock. A clear example of this 
kind of IT focused service is Case 8 that belongs to independent and standardized SaaS services as 
indicated in figure 16. 
Case 8 is a company that provides a separate business account targeting entrepreneurs and micro business owners. However, they offer all kinds of accounting related extensions related to invoicing and keeping an online store. The end goal is to provide efficiency and automatization for back-end business functions available for small businesses in affordable, convenient and easy manner. In the future the company may partner up with other providers to expand on the services they provide for the target group. If that happens, the operating model will expand towards an e-marketplace model, where third parties can expand and extend the value of original offering for the end-user.  
Technology compatibility and switching cost are something that all the SaaS providers need to 
consider. If the company provides little to none technology compatibility, it’s very difficult for the 
clients to engage with their service as the switching costs are high and maybe the technological 
solution is unknown or difficult to access for the new users enabling them to change over. Case 3 
that belongs to independent and standardized SaaS services faced this issue, as they were trying to 
change a rather traditional field operating mainly or solely offline into its e-marketplace. 
Understandably the step moving over to online from offline is a big and potentially demanding one. 
The company discovered that the main hindering reason was a lack of simple and easy software that 
would make the client’s current operations more efficient and easier, but also to allow them to gain 
effective sales channel to boost their utilization. In their experience selling their offering to new 
clients wasn’t very difficult as their business doesn’t rely on network effects nor personalized 
offering to create value.  
Some of the SaaS services might be rather complicated and restricted in the way they are to be 
operated. Standardized SaaS offerings represent the biggest subcategory concerned about this. They 
plan prior to usage the service path and don’t include personalized flexibility or machine learning 
making the service appear more intuitive and personalized for the user. Microsoft Office, Salesforce 
and Adobe are good examples of these as people train to learn how to use them. Within SaaS 
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services it isn’t that uncommon that individuals using the SaaS might require more specialization or 
training. The providing company may need to spend time educating potential and current customers 
on how to use the software as well as to provide customer help. Additionally, many wishes to 
secure positive customer experience and realization of the promised business benefits and help the 
customers with onboarding and later in adjust, modify and further develop the system based on the 
insights by the users to make the experience even better. However, these services tend to be 
connected with the maturity of the business and the deal size. As, building customer understanding 
in the early stages and supporting major clients tend to be top priorities when dividing resources. 
Case 5 B2B side offers free consulting and helps the users on onboarding to ease their success with 
the client. Case 12 has taken a step further, by charging the client only based on their ability to fulfil 
the promised business value.  
Case 12 is a mental healthcare provider that operates virally, builds real time progress on the wellbeing and provides access to the healthcare professionals on that data. They operate a two-month treatment plan with weekly exercises that are shared in real time to the therapist via dashboard that enables them to treat more patients with less time while improving results due to the real-time communication based on the progress. The company evaluates its successes based on two main barometers: patient flow and clinical treatment success. The company started as a preventive healthcare provider in the area of psychological wellbeing but moved into treatment as that is more lucrative business than prevention. Tradition treatment models for therapy are very expensive, treatment is difficult to get and there are side effects of the current medicine used by the patients. There is more demand than supply for accessing treatment. For that reason they build a scalable and easily accessible business that could work as the first step for getting help in mental issues. This could replace many drug prescriptions that tend to offer the first help now, although half of the patients suffer from side effects.  
4.3.2 Client and user 
Typical clients of SaaS include both B2B and B2C sides, but B2B tends to be the primary focus as 
companies often seem to provide a more lucrative and stable client base. Regardless, many if not 
most companies seem to offer something for both sides. Having B2C side as their secondary client 
base, providing additional source of income and a valuable trial group to test new products, services 
and features with. However, some companies choose to focus solely on one of the sides. 
As many SaaS might be rather technical solutions, most of the users are professional or semi-
professional in using that kind of service or product. This means that the provider of SaaS needs to 
be ready to educate the users or facilitate such user-friendly design or customer support that these 
users are helped to grow into professional users with that piece of software. Alternatively, the SaaS 
provider can rely on other similar companies to educate the users, like the industry leader or first 
mover in the space. Many of the SaaS seek to enable digitizing to foster digitalization, helping the 
company to transform its operations in a more efficient and modern way. One of these tech focused 
examples is Case 8. 
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Case 8’s clients are entrepreneurs, freelancers and micro-business owners, mostly the user and buyer are the same person or works in close relation with the buyer. Given the target group the company 
doesn’t need to differentiate much between the decision maker and the end-user of the service that makes the business model slightly less complex. However, the company finds legislation in its operating space rather heavy with the ability to hinder new competitors from entering the market, but also enabling the company to expand comparatively easy within European Union where the company plans to expand 
Interestingly with SaaS the buyer of the product might be a different person than the actual user of 
the SaaS. The bigger and more hierarchical the organization is in B2B the more likely this is. This 
can be difficult from the sales perspective, as there might be many decision makers between the 
user and the decider on whether to make the purchase in the first place and what features are 
included to the deal. The idea between what is needed or how the job should be done can vary a lot 
depending who’s asked. A good SaaS provider understands this controversy and seeks to mitigate 
the difficulties that might rise from it. Two clear examples of these are both Case 12 and Case 5 
B2B side. Both of the companies sell their goods for organizations, enabling the employees’ access 
for the service. However, the offering and deal are done in complete separation with the end-user. 
However, both services are monitored and developed based on the usage. This however doesn’t 
affect the client’s employees service experience as there isn’t means for involvement as the users 
are always protected by complete anonymity.  
Case 12 targets big corporations to become clients. They focus on the B2B businesses providing client companies employees access for their treatment plan. Employees that use the service are seen as users only. They can access their treatment plan and share it in the peer-support group anonymously. The 
client company, B2B side, has different access, they see aggregated data on their employees’ progress and wellbeing that’s anonymous. The client companies provide the service as a healthcare benefit for the employees. The company sales the solution in two different continents and the biggest differentiating factor is in the buyer side, as they are insurance companies in the US, but organizations and healthcare providers in Finland. In this way accessing clients and users are rather wide apart.  
This problem doesn’t exist as much in the B2C services as there tends to be less difference between 
the decision maker and the user if any. For the ones that do have separate actors, the applications 
tend to facilitate multiple user accounts or different service viewpoints. For instance, Netflix and 
Spotify have separate family deals that provide different access to the service based on the user. 
This separates the accounts which also allow the provider to keep providing more accurately 
differentiated services for each user improving the user experience, help the user to fall in love with 
the product and develop extremely loyal and committed users into fans. Although, fans tend to be 
associated mainly with B2C side, it isn’t unheard of to develop such affectionate users also in the 
B2B side. Fans, clients and marquees can play an important role in the success of a company. They 
can advocate the company by recommending, rating and offering a public reference that can help 
the company to build credibility and positive expectations among future clients for its future success 
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and spread the knowledge. This is especially valuable if the service includes front payment, heavy 
investments or switching costs associated to the service. (Edelman, 2015) 
Many of the famous SaaS target masses, meaning that these services are super acceptable, useful 
and convenient and provide value for most users. Examples of these are storing files on cloud and 
being able to access them from any location and device with Dropbox, Box or Google Drive. Being 
able to communicate online with others via Skype, Gmail and Outlook. Enabling fast co-working in 
online space via Microsoft Teams and Slack. Providing secure online payment systems via PayPal 
and Bitcoin. Both Case 7 and Case 3 are SaaS that target mass consumption. Case 3’s business 
model isn’t as risky, investment heavy nor complex as Case 7’s.  
Case 7’s B2C side the first adopters tend to be urban, male around their thirties. However, they target all individuals and have been able to target the population well from multiple user groups, especially the younger. The company targets all smartphone users among iOS and Android users, supporting all the banks. The acquisition cost per each new user tends to be rather high as the company has spent a lot for marketing efforts to gain the userbase it has. The focus is to support the B2C experience and make it as good as possible. As the B2C side has grown the company has been able to attract more B2B clients and partners that provide the cash flow for the company. The network effect is rather clear on the 
business model as the receiver or a payment can’t receive it unless they have or download the application. This has helped the company to grow on both B2B and B2C markets as more users draw also clients and partner to the network. As the company passed 5 million users, the company was reviewed as big by other players on the market and gain attraction. On the B2B side the early movers have been big brands associated with low single payment sales targeting younger population. Legislation is one of the hindering elements of mass SaaS solutions. Due to local legislation the company hasn’t been able to support different nationalities across users, but instead have established 
sister companies under the same brand to each location. In addition, they don’t support end-user engagement across borders, but limit them to national exchanges. However, these companies do benefit 
from the organization wide reputation that isn’t limited into a single country unit. Moreover, some of the partnerships might be convertible to multiple geographical locations.   
Case 3’s target audience of B2C is the entire population within major cities. The company hopes to gain all of the salon users to its platform. However, the biggest user group is women between 18 to 40-year-old that combine around 80% of their current users. The target within B2B clients are all salons from cities, mainly within Finland, but also other Nordic cities. A limiting factor for covering the entire market in each country is mainly value added. If a village has only a single service provider, the 
company can’t necessarily improve its efficiency nor help in gaining additional clients. However, the more providers are, the more value it brings for the end-user while also adding value for the service provider. This also explains why the company focuses in big cities within a wider geographical location.  
Unlike extremely famous SaaS providers that operate globally, most SaaS target an industry niche. 
Providing a particular value for a specific group. A niche might later grow into a local mass or a 
global niche, but it tends to keep the focus on providing solutions for a more specific need and or 
group. Depending on the focus of local or global niche the company is likely to develop and expand 
its offering accordingly. A company that solely wants to offer goods in a particular geographical 
location is likely to expand its offering covering more and more services and products as they 
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expand. This offering can be expanded together with partners and third-party providers or by 
reshaping the business model to facilitate an e-marketplace. Whereas a company with global niche 
focus is more likely to keep the offering more limited but expand geographically between nations. 
These country expansions might be done via licensing deals, greenfield operations or acquiring 
local competitors. Many of the national expansions tend to start from few clients in bigger cities 
slowly covering most of the relevant national players in the market if successful. When establishing 
operations abroad supporting the local cultural adaptation and marketing might help ease the way 
with both B2B and B2C. 
However, more important than the geographical area tends to be connections to clients. In fact, 
SaaS businesses are only loosely tied into geographical area. This is one of the advantages of the 
SaaS model, as expansion is less tied to nation nor cultural or language support. However, this also 
means that SaaS providers tend to compete under global markets. Whoever can provide the service 
in best, most convenient and price competitive manner with good references is likely to win. Some 
of the local constrains tend to deal with legal manners, where the provider might have to support 
rather heavy operations to comply with the local legislation. The constrains coming from legislation 
vary much between the field of operations and even between businesses. 
Another important factor of SaaS is customer references, signing famous, important and well-
known references often provide the company with means to expand, gain more name and access 
bigger potential client base. In fact, after signing few well-known organizations the company is 
more likely to be approached by potential clients themselves instead having to cold call potential 
buyers to the same extent. Some refer to this kind of expansion strategy as marquee (Edelman, 
2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Church, 2017), where the company builds its 
credibility and trustworthiness partially relying of industry and market leaders globally and locally 
targeting them as their clients to draw attention and wider interest on the market. At times SaaS 
companies might sign less profitable, unprofitable or even pay for the client to close the deal with 
marquees. Marquee deals may be exclusive, in which case they tend to be costlier, but also effective 
in drawing new clients. These might be more visible among B2C than B2B markets. Few examples 
include HBO and Netflix that both offer exclusive series and films that are only available through 
their channels. Similarly, many gaming companies like Sony’s PlayStation and Microsoft’s Xbox 
have exclusive games. The marquee doesn’t necessarily need to be an organization, but can also be 
a person (Church, 2017). Therefore, marquee strategies are often seen via social networks as they 
provide means of communication for a lot of influencers and celebrities that have signed 
promotional deals with brands. Case 5 has been able to get global attention by signing a deal with 
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an extremely well-known chef and celebrity. Moreover, the company got promoted by Apple on its 
App Store that has helped the company to grow within B2C side. Now as the company has moved 
over to B2B they have attracted some extremely well-known global brands to become their 
references that is likely to help them gaining future clients. 
Case 5’s focus is to grow B2B side and gain more big employees within the knowledge working space. The target clients are in the fields of IT, consulting and law. Whereas the target users are knowledge workers that need help with stress reduction and smart working habits. Big healthcare providers and 
corporations represent the company’s B2B side. However, the healthcare providers are mainly a distribution channel for accessing clients. The company has few clients around the globe, some due their own approach without any marketing efforts in that particular location. On the B2C side the target is everyone and the platform seeks any growth they can get without separate efforts in B2B. The B2B communities operating via social network model have become rather established on their own in few big cities around the globe. They were established by the users and have grown naturally without 
company interference. It’s a manifestation of the innovative usage, user centricity and the kind of passion and commitment that these individuals have felt towards the app as they have built a reflecting community in real life. 
Case 5, Case 8, Case 12 and Case 4 are companies that provide services for their niche target group, 
a specific segment of the population tied to a cultural and geographical location. All of these 
companies could however expand rather easily abroad in comparison to e-marketplaces and social 
networks as both the language and cultural boundaries don’t seem to be as restrictive as in the B2C 
applications where localizing in order to engage masses seems to be more often needed. This might 
have something to do with the fact that less people tend to be engaged with SaaS services, the 
relations where SaaS is used is more limited than in other platform types or that people have been 
more acquainted to handle operations in English in IT related environments and English is found 
more acceptable than in other platform forms. As many SaaS seek to produce efficiency and 
automate things humans need to operate less with them and the positions that do interact with SaaS 
are often specialized workers that might have training for operating the system at hand. Case 4 is a 
company that supports three languages Finnish, English and Japanese. Although, Finnish and 
English support are more than adequate in covering the company’s B2B operations that are limited 
to Finland the company wants to expand the language support within Asia among its B2C SNS side, 
that tends to be more sensitive towards localization. 
Case 4 B2C and B2B models are very different from one another when it comes to clients and users. On the B2C side the company operates under SNS logic mainly in the South-East-Asia and Japan where they have both mentors and users. The market area wasn’t intended, but the focus came from the fast adaptation in the region. The hindering factors are language barriers, access to local mentors and business partners to help the company succeed in the geographical area. On the B2B side the business 
operates under SaaS in Finland. The location reflects the owners’ ties with potential and current clients 
as they feel they can best support growth in the area. On B2B side the company don’t operate under its own brand, but rather adopt the client’s brand and makes their service seamless with the client’s website making little customizing for each client.  
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4.3.3 Monetization model 
The most common way to monetize these models is to sell services readily packaged in different 
price points, from which the user may choose the best option and change it later if needed. These 
packages vary often from free beginner package to more advanced professional version and even 
more extensive premium version many of them offer between two to five different versions with 
each of them having own price point, functionality and service limits.  
Some of the services choose to include a free option, operating a freemium model where the free 
service can be used, while others have a limited free time period to try out the service and some 
have a cheaper option for trying the service. Freemium models are most often applied for B2C 
customers while the offerings for B2B might have a free or cheaper trial period tied to time, 
gigabytes transferred or relying another measurable unit.  
Freemium models are like SNS models in the sense that they both often rely on advertising revenue 
to cover the costs. However, free SaaS services tend to try harder to extend B2C customers to pay 
for the service rather than SNS, where it’s rather rare that the platform offers any extension in 
exchange for payment for its users. More importantly, the idea behind these services are rather 
different. Free SaaS service mostly wish to showcase its reliability, functionality and innovation in 
order to convince and convert users to try and finally to pay for its service. Whereas SNS expect 
advertising to cover the costs and more after the network is established enough. 
Case 8 operates under a freemium model. The free version allows the user to get a business account free of charge in less than 5 minutes. That is the MVP. The extensions have been bundled into three alternative offerings, if the user wishes to expand the usage of the free model. The four models offered 
are: “1) a starter offer [freemium] which is at 0€/month, 2) a grower offer, which includes invoicing 
which is 9€/month and then there is something that we call 3) complete, which is 18€/month and then we have something we call 4) unlimited which is 98€/month and that's a sort of a package that we then tailored to certain particular customer groups so it's more like, you can't purchase it right away, but you can actually contact us and then we will deliver." 
Case 5 monetization model is derived from B2B and B2C markets that operate under different monetization models. The majority of the income comes from B2B side, where the employer pays by the usage, meaning by activated programs. This means that the employee needs to create a program, finish a starting survey, choose a program and start the program in order for the company to charge the client from that particular individual. On B2C the company operates with a freemium model in combination with in-app purchases on single payments depending what features the users wants to un-lock. Once the payment has been done the user can access that content without any limits. However, 
“individuals can start most of the programs for free. But if they wish to dig deeper in the topic, they can purchase additional programs that cost between 2-10€” and they can run the program as many times as they like. purchase different programs with additional single payment fee. 
Case 4 operates separate B2C and B2B SaaS business models. The majority of the income comes via B2B where the company seeks to be a low-cost operator of discussion forums designs for smartphone 
usage. On the B2B side the client company pays 100€/ month for using the service under their own 
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brand and their own domain. The company is still testing different price points and monetization 
models especially for the B2B side. The price points they have considered are 95, 500 and 1000 €/ month. The income from the consumer side is really small. The B2C version is more established and follows a freemium model, where the user can tap into public discussions for free and engage in them, 
but for private mentor discussions they need to pay a monthly fee to unlock a private chat. That is 24€/ month and with that the users can engage in with as many private mentor discussions as they like. From that payment the mentor gets 80% and the company gets 20% minus all the cost relating to payment system that they cover. Mentors make content marketing in open communities and talk about issues that then draw potential buyers to engage with them on paid one on one private chats. Some mentors use the platform to extend their connection with current clients being able to have short daily chats on top of the weekly visits. Before the company settled with the monthly fee, they had tried single payments from each conversation, but consumers preferred a monthly fee. The company also compared the price point with other online services like Spotify.  
However, the tendency of SaaS service monetization models to rely on B2B income is noticeable. 
Some of the companies like Google tend to offer free services for B2C users but sell almost the 
same ones for B2B customers. This has helped them to gain popularity among people, test and 
develop the services with free model. Gain some revenue via advertising while developing and 
testing the good and release it to the B2B market and gain additional revenue stream from it. Case 7 
and Case 3 are two examples of companies that offer their solution free for its B2C users but rely on 
its B2B sales to turn the business profitable. 
Case 7’s monetization model is focused on charging every transaction from each merchant purchased by the consumer via the solution, merchant paying a small fee for the payment solution provider. Banks that join supporting the SaaS will pay a development and distribution fee for the provider but will also gain a small fee from the payments made from these accounts. Different solutions operate with different pricing logic. However, fixed fees are around few cents and percentage-based payments are always less 
than 1,0%. Developing this solution hasn’t been cheap or easy, which is why the customers in B2B side are likely to join instead of trying to develop their own solution. This is true especially since the barrier to entry is rather high since the legislation in the industry, but also due to the complexity or the scattered players the company needs to support in order to provide a solution as well as the high costs of acquiring new users via marketing and building that userbase the monetization model relies on. The company has developed its business model and is at its growth phase. However, as the company has 
and is investing a lot towards acquiring big enough user base they are still in the ‘Death Valley’, seeking to break even in few years. However, the focus isn’t in becoming profitable, but to grow among new users. The company monitors a lot of different data points to determine their success. The main key interest areas are within the number of active users and their amount of usage. After it, secondary interest is around user location and the number of merchants they have acquired as clients. The company believes strongly on its value proposition as well as their capabilities in realizing it. They estimate themselves to be extremely efficient and believes to be ten times more efficient than an average organization. 
Case 3 has two streams of income one from selling the SaaS and another from the e-marketplace as they get a cut from all the sales done through it. The SaaS solution has a monthly subscription based on the number of users and some addition cost depending on the customized service package. All of the SaaS users gain free access for the e-marketplace, however not all of them try or use it. The e-marketplace monetization logic is based on the sales. The company takes a 10% commission from each sale made in the e-marketplace. Around half of the company’s profits come from the e-marketplace. 
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Another monetization model, that is quite rare is simply based on actualized value for the client. It 
could also be described as charging based on how well the company was able to keep its promised 
value proposition in delivering the service while monitoring for the quality standards. If the 
company is doing something rather new that the market isn’t used to or the value proposition seems 
too good to be true, this monetization model might help the organization to gain clients to try the 
service for themselves with little risk of being scammed. 
Case 12 charges based on the clinical evidence of the treatment the participant has gained, so unless the company can provide clinically valid metrics of the treatment for a single patience no payment is requested. This model has lowered the entry barrier and does seem very attractive business model  for parties seeking for a health solution around mental health. The monetization model currently operates under B2B income, selling the service for corporations. However, the future vision is to get additional income from the government bodies like KELA subsidizing the service in Finland. In the US the plan is to attract insurance companies to become clients. The company measures its success based on the actual effectiveness of the treatment and seeks to develop it even better within clinically approved metrics. 
4.4 Social Networking Sites The key differentiating feature between Social Networking Sites (SNS) and other platforms types is 
its focus on arranging and categorizing information or its ability to support interacting with people 
as illustrated in figure 18. The findings presented here rely heavily on the interviews of three 
organizations: Case 1, Case 4 B2C side, Case 5 B2C side. However, additional support is provided 
by some famous companies that also follow the described Social Networking Sites strategy: 
CouchSurfing, Facebook, Flickr, Google+, Happn, HappyPancake, IMDB, Instagram, OkCupid, 
Pinterest, Plenty of Fish, Reddit, Snapchat, Telegram, Tinder, Tumblr, Twitter, WeChat, 
WhatsApp, WikiLeaks, Wikipedia, Vivino and YouTube. 
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Figure 18, Social Networking Sites platform strategies 
 
Own creation.  
4.3.1 SNS strategies 
Social Networking Sites refer to a platform model, where the platform focuses on building 
connectivity, networks and enabling people to find social groups. While many of these focus on 
connecting friends with each other, many of them also help to expand users’ network by connecting 
the person with likeminded people or otherwise expand their current network. These groups often 
evolve around established Social Networking Sites, local communities, events, hobbies or other 
interest groups. These also provide good starting grounds for niche Social Networking Sites, 
attracting a smaller segment first and expanding further after a successful start. There are several 
tactics how a smaller niche can first be attracted. However, the two most common are by starting 
with a platform that organizes valuable information smartly by creating an information driven SNS 
and another one is by providing a technical frame supporting small groups exchanges by creating a 
people driven SNS. This division is the key insight this thesis offers for understanding SNS better 
thus illustrating it in figure 19 and discussing the topic in more detail below.  
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Figure 19, SNS division between information and people driven platforms 
 
Own creation.  
4.4.1.1 SNS creating primary data 
The first platform strategy is focused on information, gaining and sharing it. These are application 
that are used to find information, something that all the users can build on by adding their 
descriptions, reviews and starring. Additionally, these SNS may sell different advertising solution 
that place adds among the search results or suggestions. However, these tend to be rather well 
disguised blending into the rest of the content. This model can be further divided into platforms that 
mainly generate primary data or mainly organize secondary data.  
Example SNS companies that create primary data include companies like Vivino, YouTube, 
Tumblr, Flickr, Google+ and Twitter. Additionally, interviewed Case 4 B2C side and Case 5 B2C 
side belong to these strategies. These are platforms that rely heavily on new unique data generated 
by the users. For instance, Vivino gathers data and ratings around wines, grouping them into 
different wine profiles and subcategories. The user may look suggestion on what wine to buy or 
69 
 
how to serve it best. Later the user can rate and comment on his or her experience on the wine that 
everyone can see. When the user searches for merlot wines under 15€ the adds appear discretely as 
a preferred order displaying the wine higher in the list than it might otherwise be in. This way the 
platform targets all wine lovers that wish to remember own experiences, share them and gain views 
from others.  
4.4.1.2 SNS organizing secondary data 
The latter group of information driven Social Networking Sites that emphasize or solely build on 
top of secondary data are companies like IMDB, Pinterest, Wikipedia and WikiLeaks. Wikipedia is 
a good example, as the company builds profiles simply based on existing information. All the 
information that cannot be cited and so verified correct by other websites are removed. Moreover, 
the company relies on enthusiast individuals who have an interest and knowledge and are willing to 
share it with others. 
4.4.1.3 SNS connecting with user’s network 
The latter platform strategy starts by building a technical frame supporting group exchanges. 
Instead of prioritizing on providing information it provides a medium to connect and share with 
others. So, the starting point isn’t what but with who, having a keen focus on people, individuals 
and the social factor. This group can be further divided into platforms that focus on enhancing 
existing networks or alternatively focus on expanding user’s personal network.  
The first category’s technical frame helps the user to stay in touch with the current network and 
provides alternative channels to communicate with. Examples of this strategy are provided by 
Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram and WeChat. Facebook’s initial targeted group was Harvard 
University students to connect with each other. This rather specific target group grew rapidly 
covering other university students that wanted to connect with the original group. Later Facebook 
became national, expanded abroad and became the global service it is today.  
4.4.1.4 SNS expanding user’s network 
The latter group of social people driven networks that expand the user’s network are companies like 
Tinder, Instagram and Couchsurfing as well as the interviewed Case 1. Tinder is an example or 
global niche strategy where the company was striving to gain single people to join first from limited 
number of bigger cities and later anywhere. Instagram started as a platform for photo sharing. Users 
displaying their shoots. The platform grew by existing networks as well as attracting niche groups. 
Among these professionals and hobbyist like photographers, models, influencers, makeup artist and 
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fashion brands soon adopted the platform. By then the platform had caught the public’s attention 
and the masses joined in. 
4.4.2 Offering 
The simplest examples of Social Networking Sites are different discussion forums that enable 
commenting and chatting with others. Many providers have made these to serve a rather particular 
need. However, great Social Networking Sites enable innovation and creativity around usage. In 
fact, the original plan may vary with the user’s usage quite much. As the users are very much in the 
center of the platform, it tends to be developed with a more user-lead development, where the way 
users have adopted the platform may alter it even more on how it’s further developed and adjusted. 
To enhance user’s creative usage most Social Networking Sites have built constructs and functions 
that are loosely predetermined. It may be an ability to create a new discussion forum, a group, 
conversation starter, claim, piece of information or another sharable thing. This is one of the key 
functions on how it varies from both e-marketplaces and especially SaaS as they are rather 
predetermined on how those platforms are meant to be used whereas with Social Networking Sites 
majority of the value is provided by individual users. In fact, the platform provider doesn’t provide 
any content, but the content is the users interactions with one another that are facilitated.   
It seems that most Social Networking Sites focus on facilitating public, private or combined 
network channels. Companies like Twitter, Wikipedia, WikiLeaks and Vivino are some of the rare 
ones that are completely public. Meaning that all the conversations held are completely open for 
anyone to read. The difficulty with this is, its constraining factor being totally public having little 
privacy within discussions. A similar niche group is compiled of companies that are completely 
private and thus cannot be read or joined by anyone online. These are companies like Telegram and 
WhatsApp. The difficulty with these is to gain new users as they rely heavily on fried referrals and 
existing networks. By far most Social Networking Sites platforms are a combination between the 
two former groups combining both public and private features. Often the user can modify the 
privacy settings self to determine how comfortable they are sharing the things with world wide web. 
Facebook, YouTube, WeChat, Snapchat, Pinterest, Google+ and Instagram are all services where 
the user may choose to keep something only for oneself, share with friends or with everyone. 
Although the combined solution could be as simple as enabling both public chat forum with ability 
to start a private chat many have more sophisticated solutions and varieties. Consequently, it’s no 
surprise that all the three organizations interviewed fall under the last combined Social Networking 
Sites form: Case 1, Case 4 B2C side, Case 5 B2C side.   
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As part of the application’s key value is tied into its user-base, the more users the company has the 
more valuable the Social Networking Sites becomes for each user. Therefore, users’ trust towards 
company’s future success and ability to drive user base growth is essential. This is especially true as 
building a social profile and engaging in a network is time consuming and switching cost tends to 
be high as there are little means to copy your data and transfer it to another social platform in most 
cases. This means that new users need to believe that it’s worth to build a profile and engage in that 
platform to become a user. It helps if there are interesting people or topics that the individual wishes 
to engage with prior joining. It also helps if the user believes in the future of the platform as there is 
no guarantee of a success as platforms can fail much faster than they were established. This means 
that the public’s perception of the platform matters. If there are competing platforms the user is 
likely to join the most popular as it gives them access to the biggest network unless the smaller one 
is more relevant in terms of the topics or people involved. Moreover, failing fast is always an option 
as past success doesn’t secure future success.  
Although negative press can be fatal for all platforms, it seems to have biggest impact on social 
platforms and a mistake might turn into a scandal or even fatal misfortune. Some examples of social 
platforms that run into bad press image and resulted into mass migrating users to competing 
platforms. Such migrations have happened with Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Snapchat and 
Twitter. WhatsApp has had rumors about changing the application into payable version as well as 
collecting private data and messages. Both news has helped its competitors grow, as users have 
changed into alternative applications as means to retaliate against bad policies and negative public 
image. The company has also hit the news as illegal content has spread around its platforms like 
circulating sex tapes. Facebook has had multiple negative press attacks especially around data 
privacy as well as transparency and online harassment. Some users have been convicted based on 
the things they wrote within Facebook groups. Instagram has been accused of violation content 
ownership and IPR. Snapchat has been accused of distorting concept of beauty by advocating usage 
of heavy filters that augment the reality reflecting poorly towards self-image especially among 
young girls. Twitter has had issues with hate speech. Many of these Social Networking Sites do 
have trouble with online harassment as well as deleting inappropriate content such as pornographic, 
fake or violent content. One example of people driven SNS that focused on expanding users’ 
networks was Case 1, a Social Networking Sites platform that experienced a massive user 
disappearance and decline due to internal difficulties along with changing market conditions and 
poor allocation of resources. 
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Case 1 is an extremely interesting example company of Social Networking Sites as they were a national leader within their space for years. They offer a social platform for people to connect and share content with in private and public chat rooms little like Facebook. They offer different chat and sharing platforms for B2C side. A lot of the activity happens within profiles and chatrooms. The company was able to engage a lot of users to its platform. Some of the developments followed consumers own innovations on how to further customize profiles or what kind of discussions and activities people wanted to engage in. The B2B offering includes 1) brand exposure to enhance their brand recognition, 2) tactical marketing direct consumers to another website and 3) influence marketing seeking to influence public opinion on a matter. These offerings may manifest oneself as games, lotteries and fun 
ads at the host’s website. The company has undergone a lot of changes during their nearly 20 years of operations. They have seen a huge growth, success, global competition, disengagement and migration of users to other channels, decline from mass to niche player within the field and regrouping. It seems that there were multiple attributes that in combination resulted the negative outcome for the SNS. 
Case 1’s downward spiral started as the company was sold to a new party in the attempt to grow global. It invested heavily on expanding abroad by rebuilding the brand at each local market from the scathes with local employees. However, none of the expansions paid off and the service remained as a niche player in each new location. The company hadn’t been able to utilize its existing brand or users in gaining popularity elsewhere nor had enough expertise or budget to pull off its expansion attempts. While the investments had drained into localization and marketing the development of the platform had frozen. This investment plan, globalization focus, and the vision are the most likely explaining factors of the fatal miscalculation that followed in the home market. The company had enjoyed the perks of being the leader within its national market. While it was focused on succeeding globally and relocated its resources into market entry strategies elsewhere it failed to sense the bigger transformation of the industry and the immediate threat of its global rivals both within advertising industry and social media 
channels. The company had placed its trust into the new owners’ hands into believing that they had the knowledge to turn the platform into a global player. It is possible that the company may have had better chances with expansion within the national market facilitating larger variety of needs. However, the biggest single failure was probably in realizing the depth and importance of a new growing trend of mobile usage. The failure to support migration from desk devices into mobile interface was 
simultaneous with competitor’s ability in utilizing it to their advantage and increased spread of smart phones and time spend on them. The prolonged failure to meet this new need that grew into an expected standard by the consumers may have sealed the faith of falling back into a niche player. Simultaneously, new entrants were competing from the attention of this new market. That further tightened the competition of now much more crowded industry of people driven SNS. The growing problems in the mother company later paralyzed both the expansion plans and resources floating towards the service spinoff that the company had started as they were bought. Now the owner was keen on selling the company and seeking to rescue its most praised service that was facing furious media turmoil staining its reputation as a responsible player, quickly withdrawing investors and plummeting user engagement as trust was evaporating. As a result, these companies went separate ways, both having new owners and a sinking ship waiting to be rescued. Neither one of the companies were able to regain consumers interest to become what they once were. Instead, they are nearly forgotten companies of the past. Now they facilitate small niches with their services seeking profitability elsewhere.  
4.4.2 Client and user 
Most Social Networking Sites aim towards attracting big enough mass, this might mean masses or a 
global niche. Given the social need to attract big enough population the target is most cases B2C 
instead of B2B. However, as the platform grows a B2B side may be able to improve the user 
experience by widening the service offering or provide the platform owner a secondary focus group 
and potentially additional income stream. Depending on the national or global focus the company 
73 
 
will need to support its expansion towards wider offering potentially done with partners within the 
network or expanding abroad and supporting local languages and marketing efforts. Although the 
example companies operate mainly under global focus and have users around the globe, there are a 
lot of smaller Social Networking Sites that have a more local focus and tend to operate in local 
languages. In Finland suomi24.fi, vauva.fi, kaksplus.fi and Case 1 are some examples of more local 
oriented platforms. Their focus groups may vary between Finnish speakers to Finland or main cities 
within Finland. Part of the reason why Facebook has been so successful in capturing users around 
the world may lie within its heavy support on local areas. They support local languages in all of 
their main functions, and they have built a heavy support system for local networks. Moreover, they 
have combined it with global network support that enable rather unique experience. It allows users 
to connect simultaneously with multiple communities around the globe. Connecting the user to his 
or her unique network of people, events, places, communities and more. 
Although, Social Networking Sites are online they tend to be tied into local phenomenon, cultures, 
news, physical places and established networks. These are factors that both tend to root the Social 
Networking Sites and help them become more relevant and established, but also limit them into 
physical world as strong Social Networking Sites have both elements online and offline. This 
combination seems to help the individuals to establish stronger sense of community and belonging 
to it. Moreover, these seem to spark more loyalty, engagement and volunteering amongst the users. 
The users of these communities tend to have a kind of loose hierarchy amongst them based on 
knowledge, sharing, leadership and involvement. The most evident divisions seem to be between 
with influencers and followers. Influencers are people that others follow and listen. They might be 
leaders, celebrities or very keen spoke persons on a specific topic. They seek for spotlight or are 
given it. They tend to engage more than average people and the area of interest might be closely 
related to their passion or job. Followers are people that might be less engaged or draw attention 
less towards themselves but might be keen to following, support or occasionally show more interest 
and engagement towards topics and people. Followers tend to be leisure users or professionals 
seeking for information about a topic or people to engage with.  
Case 1’s B2C users are people who want to get to know new people and expand their network or date. Often these individuals are at cross paths or changing their life one way or another that results them wanting to connect with new people. These might be people that move to a new city, end school or get married. New connections often start online before moving to offline sparked by an interesting profile or conversation and optimally resulting in new real-life friendships. The majority of the users, 70-80%, are from Helsinki and other big cities. The target audience is between 18 to 30-year-old. The target clients in B2B side are big local brands and local media houses who do outsourced marketing for brands in Finland. Ultimately clients are anyone who wish to connect, influence or promote things for young adults in the major cities within Finland. The focus used to be media houses, but as the 
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company’s available efforts to connect and sell have been significantly downgraded, they have shifted the focus for direct selling to big brands focusing on bigger deals.  
4.4.3 Monetization model 
Social Networking Sites tend to operate via advertising revenue, where the platform is free for users 
and the operations are funded via selling advertising space within their platform. Famous examples 
of these are Facebook, WhatsApp, Snapchat and Instagram. However, these platforms may attempt 
to gain revenues from B2B users by offering business account or additional services like better 
reach within the network and more exposure to the target audience. Alternatively, they may gain 
revenues from B2C users by offering a premium version without adds or an extension that allows 
new usage. However, any monetary gains from the B2C tend to be rather marginal in comparison to 
other revenue streams. Moreover, extensions are mainly provided by third parties if they include 
B2C costs like in-app purchases, monthly fee or front payment. The platform owner gets a cut from 
third party revenues that might include a fixed fee and or some percentage of the price of the paid 
good. Lastly a few Social Networking Sites are nonprofits operating by volunteers or relying 
partially on volunteers. An example of this is Wikipedia, world’s largest encyclopedia where the 
content is provided and altered by volunteers. For non-profits like these the income may accumulate 
from donations and or selling fan products. 
Due to the social value creation of these networks they tend to require a long investment that might 
pay back. Just like e-marketplaces that also need to attract a rather large critical mass to become 
successful so does Social Networking Sites. Meaning that investors should count on high risk as 
well as long investment period prior payback or profitability. Proving the MVP might also take a 
long while and the monetization logic might change overtime together with maturity. The cashflow 
might be volatile resembling the unique visits within the network. However, Social Networking 
Sites aren’t usually as capital intense as e-marketplaces or at least they can survive with less. 
Although, investments into requiring new users and visibility from media might be costly, but also 
worth wile to gain attraction by masses. Like all other platforms, Social Networking Sites are also 
highly scalable. This means they may expand extremely fast and cover a wide reach. If they succeed 
in that, the platform is likely to become extremely profitable as well as reach a natural monopoly 
status that is hard but not impossible to compete against.  
Case 1 is a typical example of a social platform as they make all the revenue based on advertisings on its service. Meaning that B2C side doesn’t contribute directly for revenue growth but is essential to make businesses interested in using their marketing and advertising channel in B2B. The majority of the income comes from direct sales to big brands. The target deal size is between 10000 to 20000 euros. However, deals around 5000 euros are easier to close. The much smaller, but steady ad revenue comes from media houses. They buy an amount worth ad space that they might fill with different brands. This is the case as majority of the digital marketing money go through the media houses as they are mass 
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buyers. They sell their own marketing and advertising solutions in bundles on their own websites for 
the initial buyer whose ad might be displayed at the case company’s website as a result of this deal. As 
the company’s website started to face stronger competition and losing its users on its B2C side that had a drastic effect on its income stream. When the company did well it got a lot of revenue via media houses selling their advertising space. Now they can’t rely on the income it results. This balance shift happened in the last 10 years. Regardless of the difficulties the company has overgone in the past decade, might not simply explain the entire picture. The competition and new rivalry in the industry could have resulted in a similar situation. As mobile usage has grown, and the leisure time spent on different platforms have diversified the company would have been likely to lose some of its revenue simply based on it. What made the situation more fatal was the lack of smartphone usage support and slipping user engagement and plummeting monthly unique visitors on the website. All of these factors would have been notified by the media houses and the deals sizes would reflect the status of the 
platform’s popularity. The company was sold for the first time at its peak, the monthly unique visitors were highest, the company was supposed to become a part of bigger offering of Social Networking Sites globally and the mother company was expected to make its initial public offering (IPO) soon after. However, the IPO was delayed multiple times and then the mother company started to face bigger problems with their main offering, bad publicity, plummeting users and escaping investors. The failure was sealed with the chain of the events for both companies. Even after new ownership neither have been able to regain lost trust. 
Although, speculations have been made whether platforms can fail. It seems evident that they can. 
No platform is too big to fail. Even if the switching cost might be high or the company might even 
be a natural monopoly, disappointed and angry users should not be taken lightly. Users can find a 
way to substitute the service or live without it.  
4.5 Exception of the framework  
Two clear exceptions were found from the theoretical framework identified as dual- or multi-
business model platform strategies followed by incumbents or early phased startups. These two 
exceptions are elaborated below. E-marketplace, SaaS and Social Networking Sites business models 
are mutually exclusive models. However, these can be combined into supporting platform 
strategies. In these cases, each project has a separate goal and strategies. They may operate under 
same platform or brand but should be treated rather independently although dependencies may 
exist. Moreover, as resources are always limited, most companies are cautious on how many 
simultaneous projects they can support and what gains are expected within a time frame. Thus, most 
companies start from very narrow platform strategy, as described in figure 10, by adopting one of 
12 strategies and potentially gradually growing and expanding it further within a limited strategy 
framework to benefit from the proximity of the existing target group, offering and monetization 
model. Regardless, two groups were identified that might deviate from this model: incumbents and 
startups in a launching phase.  
However, as both dual- and multi-business models are rare with other than early stage startups and 
incumbents, it seems to speak for the fact that most startups that succeed into later growth phases 
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have chosen to focus and build their business case solely on one of the subcategories within 
platform business models. As the company matures more and has more resources at their disposal, 
usually after success, acquisition or long existence the company might move into multi-business 
model phase as a way to gain new growth or market power just like the incumbents pursuing this 
plan. 
4.5.1 Incumbents  
Many established companies have built internal platform business units, that seek to engage the 
business with new opportunities within the area via partnerships, startup engagement, incubation 
and accelerator programs, acquisitions and industry co-operation. Some famous examples of these 
are Apple, IBM, Accenture, Nestle, Microsoft and Google. In Finland companies like OP, Neste, 
Wärtsilä, Varma, Nokia, Sonera, Reaktor, HUS and Tieto are some of the companies engaged in 
these activities. Two incumbents interviewed reveal what platform engagements they have tried and 
how they paid off. 
The rationale for incumbents to adopt this strategy is rather straight forward. Big existing 
companies allocate resources to test and try new business opportunities. Exploring with platforms 
possibilities is a valuable attempt especially as the companies believe in the scalable possibilities 
one might have if a successful model is found. The companies see the difficulties they might face 
when attempting to engage with new areas, being one of the reasons why many incumbents seem to 
find it important to partner up, share and co-operate. As these companies run multiple platform 
projects, they tend to engage with multiple platform strategies, each chosen based on the project at 
hand. Case 9 highlights the importance of partnerships that’s one common way for incumbents to 
grow and renew. Moreover, the company has gained attention also abroad from the innovative trials 
it has had. However, these won’t be discussed below, as better examples of platform strategies have 
been provided within chapter 4.1. Case 11 on the other hand has had interesting trials as well, 
although not as successful. These will be discussed below as well as why these might have failed. 
Interestingly, the business case company 11 is in, represents offline platform in a traditional sense. 
Now the company has attempted to combine its offering to an online world through e-marketplace 
while exploring other plausible options.  
Case 9 is an incumbent that has surprised the other incumbent players within the field with its trials and platform engagements. The company has well acknowledged that most platform engagements don’t seem to go anywhere and mainly feel like waste of time and efforts, but that is mainly true as it is difficult to know what will pay off in the future, understand how to do it and being able to envision and realize the idea. Moreover, it takes time to prove that platform is successful and becomes profitable. 
Convincing people to invest into things that aren’t within the core capabilities is difficult, ensuring that the investments won’t be dried up too early and having a long-term vision are essential here. However, 
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the company is even more convinced that winning with others is how they have and will succeed. They are extremely keen to host discussions and share experiences within the industry, as they believe that real efforts and trials can guide them. In addition, they have mainly joined forces with other startups and companies that are keen on trying new business models. The key in attracting great partnerships has been good brand image, as many know the company to be very keen on trying, learning and doing unexpected and non-traditional moves.  
Case 11 is an incumbent that operates two main streams of business focusing on serving B2B clients. The two business streams evolve around events and renting spaces. The main value the company provides through renting spaces is to facilitate different event from small meetings to bigger workshops and other social gatherings. These services are targeted towards its B2B clients. The main value the company provides towards its B2B clients within its event space is to enhance and grow their sales by connecting them with the industry professionals and consumers. As the operations evolve around a multisided business model B2C side offering additional value for B2B clients the company has B2C as their secondary customer group. The main offering for B2C is to provide a snapshot of the variety of the market offerings in a one place conveniently and to provide information and interesting speakers. 
The network effects tied to the company’s success evolve around the big clients in B2B. Unless the company successfully closes the deal with the market leaders, they risk losing also the smaller clients within the market. Therefore, the company follows a marquee strategy, first securing the market leaders. The strategy has been rather effective as the big players devote a small amount of their marketing budget to advertise the event, they are part of. This media exposure has further drawn both the smaller players, but also individuals to the event. The key metrics within its event sales that the company follows are the total number of visitors and B2B sales about how much of the floor space has been sold. As well as how many of the tickets are sold. However, the last one is difficult as predicting 
the sales aren’t simple. Around 30% of the ticket sales happen within the last day. Moreover, predicting income and sales isn’t simple as the IT infrastructure doesn’t support interpreting current data. This is partially why the company is planning to renew its IT infrastructure. 
Case 11 has tested three separate efforts to build digital solutions around their core business. These are a mobile app, AR app and the web shop. However, none of these have been successful yet. In the future the company considers involving its sales personnel within its innovation projects instead of the current focus of simply involving IT and marketing to enhance the outcomes. The company tried building an application to enhance their visitor experience through a mobile app on 2014. The application received only around 5000 sessions during 2018 while in comparison they had hundreds of thousand visitors. This illustrates how marginal the usage has been. They have now decided to give up the mobile app. They expect the failure to be in relation with how little recourses or marketing efforts was put towards the application. In addition, the company feels that they didn’t know what they were going for or how to connect the solution to its business. This is likely reflected on its poor performance. Regardless of the past attempt the company got involved with other development projects as well. The company experimented with an AR application, building an application around augmented reality of the visitor experience. The application was built around 2017 enabling additional stream of information, advertisement space and thrill with new kind of experience and feel for the events. The AR app operates as a SaaS, however like the company said, due to lack of clarity and a target the application 
hasn’t been able to bring any added value rather destroyed it in its development. Like many other incumbents the company also engaged itself with hackathon, establishing one for itself. As a result, the current web shop was discovered. The idea with the web shop is to redirect part of its sales channel to improve efficiency. That online store operates with an e-marketplace logic. Although, the company 
hasn’t been able to realize its goals within the web shop the company is keen to keep on trying and seeking to solve current difficulties around it. They believe that they need to keep on innovating and co-creating with outsiders. Although, they feel that working with the startups is rather slow as they are discovering and seeking an operating model and might shape their business rather radically along the way.  
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Case 11’s both user and client sides cover both B2C and B2B. When it comes to targeting the public, the company is after the masses, meaning the entire population. However, each event has a more specific target group, seeking for the most relevant consumers to each event hold. Similarly, the variety of B2B clients is large, but each event is scoped to cover a certain industry niche instead of all. In many ways the company offerings are for absolutely everyone when tied to the national market, but simultaneously for quite a bit narrower group as there are always certain target groups. Currently the company engages with each user and client base only few times a year, but in the future the company considers having more continuing engagements with each of them.   
Case 11 monetization model is complex. The company operates two main streams of business that both have scattered sources of income. The business streams evolve around events and renting spaces. The event side of the business is more mature, experiencing slow decline, while renting spaces are growing quite rapidly. Both services are targeted for B2B clients and most of the income comes from B2B side. 
When it comes to selling events the company’s main source of income is gathered via selling square meters for B2B clients to take part in the event. The B2B visitors access the events for free. Since the company subsidize heavily the events to secure enough potential consumers for their B2B clients most of the B2C tickets are distributed for free and only a small segment of B2C tickets are sold. Meaning that the majority of B2C users are operated under a freemium model. The pricing model of the business is extremely complex. There are multiple variables that change the price point. In the future the company seek to build readily made packages to make the sales more effortless, convenient and transparent in terms of both service and pricing. The current online store sales around 18-20% of all the 
event sales via its online store. The main reason why it hasn’t been more successful is due to internal conflict. The sales personnel feel threatened and don’t direct the small clients towards the online store as planned since they fear being unemployed resulting in the increase of self-services provided for 
clients in the online store. The managements’ idea was to release sales personnel’s time more to focus 
on the big clients and facilitating their needs better. However, these changes haven’t been realized. Despite of the difficulties the company will more forward changing its processes and slowly transforming more towards digital solutions and trying to redirect a growing part of its sales. As part of this strategy the company is now about to renew its IT infrastructure. In addition, the company has some exclusive events operating under a different model where they pay for the speakers to come and all the attendees do pay for the ticket to access the event.  
4.5.2 New businesses 
Second group that’s rather actively associated with dual- and multi-business model approach is new 
businesses in their early stages, where they test and build the business model traditionally. This is 
applicable if the startup fails to find the right business model with the first attempt. While many 
companies do stick with the same plan from the get-go, many also test and fail few times, before 
they settle down with a business plan. Of course, changing a business plan per se don’t mean that 
the company is following a dual- or multi- business model, but it might suggest it.  
As new businesses are formed and build, they tend to go through business model discovery, 
formation and building as the startup tests and builds the business. Traditionally these happen 
during launch and early growth phases. When the company pivots to a new direction in its early 
stage it might build the new model partially on top of the old business to maximize results with 
minimal efforts. This explains why some companies might try, test and support multiple business 
models simultaneously. Three companies interviewed are examples of these dual- and multi-
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business models. Below are described their discovery and early growth phases and why they 
changed directions or support multiple platform models. 
Case 3 started as a marketplace business but ran into difficulties as they discovered that their target 
clients didn’t have a software that would support their journey to cloud and to join their e-marketplace. After the discovery the company pivoted its strategy to follow a SaaS strategy to provide enabling software for digital transformation. Now they sell the SaaS solution for the clients that enable them to join the marketplace. As the company expanded its offering, they have now two streams of income one from selling the SaaS and another from the e-marketplace as they get a cut from all the sales done there. Since this strategic change the company has gained a monopoly like situation in its market space in Finland.  
Case 4 is still in its launch period, testing and building a business model and its business case. The company started with its focus on building a Social Networking Sites mainly for B2C users. But it had an e-marketplace function where users could buy professional help and professionals could showcase their work with lower entry barrier. Unlike traditional e-marketplaces that focus on efficiency, search 
functions and displaying alternatives and prices the company hasn’t supported these but provided an e-marketplace function with a traditional SaaS monetization model. Moreover, they have embedded commercials and professional services into their Social Networking Sites tools again not following any typical platform model like the Social Networking Sites where ads would be clearly indicated but blurring the line between a discussion and ad. The main function is anonymous chat groups, where people can talk freely about problematic thigs and situations. A user can find and expand a conversation into a private format with a professional. This said, the e-marketplace isn’t easy and efficient, but it enables low entry barrier. However, now the company has moved towards a SaaS model focusing on B2B markets as the market seems more lucrative and requires less capital than a e-marketplace model. 
The company hasn’t given up any of their earlier functionalities, but still supports all of them. Moving to B2B markets and providing internal SaaS solutions for organizations have helped the company to improve its cash flow that the company has further used to developing the service and maintaining the current business. The company has secured some big deals but is still in a launch phase testing its business model especially in the B2B side. Although, the platform has rather complex business model, it might get even more complex as they consider licensing deals to expand on other markets within Asia. 
Case 5 started as a SaaS with a freemium model targeting B2C market globally in 2014. However, they pivoted in 2017 towards B2B as the market seems more lucrative and due to the sensitive nature of their SaaS service which is also why they haven’t benefited much from word of mouth. “One of the biggest successes of the company has also been one of the biggest hurdles in growth, around users experiencing shared humanity. This happened in B2C side as people shared very personal hardships, difficulties and learnings. As these public posts are semi-anonymous, most people didn’t want their friends necessarily 
to find about them. As people don’t tend to share their struggles around selflove in Facebook for instance. Still for most users the service is their personal secret, that they don’t want to share with their social groups’ as users explore and share about their vulnerable side. This Social Networking Sites model was too difficult to pull off to reach masses and make the business model work. The company changed into complete anonymity with B2B side. As the programs were completely anonymous and no company leader could track what individuals were choosing nor compare the progress. This has most likely reflected positively on the experiences. Employees engaged with far more softer topics than the client leadership had expected to. The company is happy with the new direction as almost 100% of the current revenue comes from B2B side. Moreover, the leadership first treated the business as a Social Networking Sites and tried to encourage public sharing and content creation that is typical for a Social Networking Sites which it was able to do in most part. The main surprise came from the fact that they 
weren’t able to benefit from word of mouth and tap into user’s personal networks and expand through them. As the company realized this, they changed the business model into a SaaS. The company still supports Social Networking Sites engagements but have moved more towards a typical SaaS business 
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model and is currently seeking to find more growth through B2B sales. The B2B experience has been 
built on top of the B2C platform, however that isn’t optimal for the growth, cashflow and future, so the company is currently undergoing a huge reshaping around UX (user design) in its attempt to move more towards B2B and SaaS model. 
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5. DISCUSSION   This section discusses findings in the light of current literature highlighting how they support and 
agree as well as contradict and disagree on platform strategies with one another. The focus is kept in 
the proposes theoretical framework by this thesis illustrated in figure 9, that represents the key 
finding of the thesis introduced in the opening of findings and analysis chapter. Thus, answering to 
the research question set for this study: what strategies platforms apply as they go in business and 
how they attempt to grow? 
5.1 Framework’s contribution to platform strategy  
The key problem with platform related strategy literature is that it often doesn’t involve a lot of 
context around the suggestions it gives. Meaning that models and guides are either very specific and 
detailed without context or the discussion stays only on a high level. While the discussion might be 
beneficial on a scope of single factor or limited area, they tend to be difficult to connect with rest of 
the literature, concept and give both broad and more specified framework of the topic. Thus, the 
framework of this thesis is valuable as it has combined both high level concept of platform 
strategies and more specific tactics that companies can apply to execute them.   
Although, there is little literature that has tried to answer the question set for this thesis, there is a 
lot of literature on platforms. Platform literature has been widely used to understand the concept and 
to be able to provide added value on the topic. Thus, the 12 strategies of the framework are heavily 
leaning on current literature on the concepts of e-marketplace (Oliver, 1990; Brunn, Jensen & 
Skovgaard, 2002; Eng, 2004; Scott & Scott, 2004; Standing et al., 2006; Tao, Chen & Chang, 2007; 
Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Cusumano, 2011b; Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Hagiu, 
2014; Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Strowel and Vergote, 2016; Wan et 
al., 2017; Thakur, 2019), software as a service (Focacci et al., 2003; Concha et al., 2010; Bibi, 
Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012; Lee, Park & Lim, 2013; Shuying, Shuai & Sun, 2013) and social 
networking sites (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Bergman et al., 2011; Cusumano, 2011a; Carpenter, 
2012; Liu et al., 2012; Ullman, 2012; Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Kwon, Stefanone & Barnett, 2014; 
Li, Liu & Li, 2014; Lee, 2014; Stefanone & Barnett, 2014; Park, Jun & Lee, 2015; Strowel and 
Vergote, 2016; Lim & Choi, 2017; Pornsakulvanich, 2017; Gao et al., 2018; Yang & Robinson, 
2018). Consequently, the platform framework has firm grounds to build new knowledge on top of 
it. 
While some authors have tried to further group platforms in a meaningful manner, the concepts 
haven’t been much improved due to inconsistent and shallow targets. For instance, Hagiu and 
Spulber (2013) classified two-sided platform providers based on the free service, which they 
82 
 
offered. They coined six different subgroups in their model, but in comparison to this thesis’ 
framework their model only covers 5/12 categories with much less consistency as described below 
in further detail. 
Furthermore, their idea of e-marketplace platform is limited to only cover business driven platforms 
by “E-commerce sites (Amazon, eBay, Alibaba) provide market information and customer ratings” 
as well as “smart phone and tablet original equiment manufactureres provide first-party applications 
and e-commerce information (e.g., Apple’s iPhone and iPad apps and App Store)” (Hagiu & 
Spulber, 2013). This classification disregards all consumer driven e-marketplaces that have grown 
to represent a definite part of our society. Furthermore, it groups together both online marketplaces 
as well as technology, that enables connecting to a marketplace, conceptually mixing the outcome 
and the mean together in an unfortunate manner.  
Similarly, they cover SaaS only by focusing on platforms that are directed for independent users, 
where the value isn’t produced in social context. While they further group these into three different 
kind groups, they never acknowledge their link to SaaS as they cover “video game console 
manufacturers provide first-party games (Microsoft’s Xbox 360 game Halo, Sony’s Playstation 3 
game Gran Turismo, Nintendo’s Wii Sports)” and “operating system vendors provide first-party 
software applications (Microsoft’s Windows includes Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player 
and Google’s Android includes apps such as Sky Map, Finance, and Places Directory)” and “search 
engines and Internet portals (Google, Bing, Yahoo!) provide search results (website links, maps, 
news, weather, entertainment, books, articles, images, video)” (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013). 
Although, the authors have done a decent job in covering the first two categories the last is left so 
vague that it rather creates confusion than improves knowledge. However, a kind interpretation 
would be that they refer to people driven SNS that rely on existing networks “social networks such 
as Facebook provide network information (news feeds, games, digital gifts, email notifications, 
friend suggestions, information sharing, ability to comment, notifications from fan sites, and virtual 
currency such as Facebook Credits)” (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013), in which case they have only 
covered ¼ categories of the phenomenon. This ignores the authors reference towards “virtual 
currency”, that arguably doesn’t below to SNS, but represents a socially dependent SaaS where any 
other user provides additional value to all users and this isn’t dependent on Social Networking 
Sites. 
Another subgrouping of platform business is introduced by Strowel and Vergote (2016) who 
created five subgroups of digital platforms based on the type of resources they grant access to. Their 
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logic only focuses on what is offered, disregarding how it is offered or the structure behind the 
offering. Given this it is no wonder, their subgroups provide little use for discussing platform 
strategies. While 2/5 of their groups are useful and support a more holistic view, perhaps by 
accident 3/5 of their groups create confusion rather than consistency to the platform discussion. 
While their method and outcome are little to praise for, they were able to cover 8/12 groupings 
vaguely, while 5/12 were somewhat useful and 3/12 could have been populated more meaningfully. 
Despite their grouping, it ignores the current importance of SNS in the platform discussion. 
Consequently, their first group mixes ¾ subgroups of SaaS together with ¼ subgroups of SNS. 
While they named the groups as a) “access to information (or content) such as general search 
engines (e. g. Google, Bing) or specialised search engines (e. g. TripAdvisor, Yelp, Google 
Shopping, Kelkoo, Twenga); this category also includes other services granting access to a great 
variety of content, for instance maps (e. g. Google Maps, Bing Maps) or more creative content such 
as news aggregators (e. g. Google News, Twitter) or video platforms (e. g. YouTube, Dailymotion)” 
(Strowel & Vergote, 2016). 
Their second group is b) “access to personal data and other ‘private’ content such as the social 
networks (e. g. Facebook, LinkedIn)” (Strowel & Vergote, 2016). This group combines socially 
dependent SaaS together with people driven SNS. Meaning that they combine extremely different 
business logic together since they share a single variable “access to personal data”. If this logic is 
applied, publishing listings of new graduates online could also be grouped here as well as many 
intra pages that give assess to a company’s workers information such as OurWorkDay. While these 
kind of listings around a single parameter can be made, they fail to move the conversation on and to 
indicate something valuable. This is the main flaw of the authors here. Their third grouping is just 
as vague being c) “access to a workforce or to the expertise or intellectual capabilities of people 
(TaskRabbit, Upwork); the ‘task platforms’ raise specific issues with regard to labor” (Strowel & 
Vergote, 2016). 
The two more accurate groupings are d) “access to money or capital such as crowdfunding sites (e. 
g. Kickstarter, Gofundme) or payment systems (e. g. PayPal, Mastercard, Bitcoin)” (Strowel & 
Vergote, 2016). That combine 2/4 SaaS groups into one discussing both independent and socially 
dependent groups. Next the authors combine 3/4 subgroups of e-marketplace, combining both 
business driven sides together and then indicating that they are same as service offering-based 
consumer driven e-marketplace. As indicated by them e) “access to goods and/or services offered 
by third parties such as online markets (e. g. Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, Allegro, Booking.com) or 
‘sharing economy’ platforms (e. g. Airbnb, Uber, BlaBlaCar); here, a great variety of goods and/or 
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services is offered. It is not completely clear whether the new ‘sharing economy’ platforms should 
be treated differently from the already known online markets” (Strowel & Vergote, 2016).  
Although, the two models by Hagiu and Spulber (2013) and Strowel and Vergote (2016) aren’t in 
line with the framework proposed by this thesis. It shows, similarity in thinking that platform 
strategies and groupings are understood too little and that it is difficult to try to capture it and fill 
this knowledge gap. Even when the two frameworks fail to address multiple critical business 
decisions to help create specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound goal achievement 
by platforms. They also lack consistency and provide little answers for business decision makers 
when discussing how to start or grow a platform business. Hence, this thesis answers these 
questions much more effectively with its 12 categories by the suggested framework. However, the 
strength of the framework relies within three well known concepts on the literature, that seem to be 
mutually exclusive being (1) e-marketplace, (2) software as a service and (3) social networking sites 
as well as on top of authors that pursue the difficult questions and suggest frameworks, even if they 
are proven incorrect in the future.  
5.2 Framework’s contribution to platform types Since the recent success of e-marketplace platforms, the topic has received more attention and is 
covered within the platform literature much more than many other topics. Given this, the new 
insights that this thesis can bring precisely towards understanding e-marketplaces is much more 
limited than towards building knowledge within the other concept areas such as SaaS, SNS and 
platform strategies. However, including e-marketplaces within the scope of this thesis has been a 
must as the aim has been to contribute on the topic meaningfully. If e-marketplace platforms had 
been left out due to the small contribution that can be made in this specific domain, the potential 
relevance when answering the research question, what strategies platforms apply as they go in 
business and how they attempt to grow, had also been less significant. Building a holistic 
understanding of what strategies these companies use demand, that the most topical part is included 
to the discussion. Although, the strategies and subcategories of e-marketplaces aren’t exactly new, 
but rather well confirmed and supported by the literature it gives a positive indication that the topic 
might be rather accurately reflecting the reality. Similarly, if this is a good way to form and indicate 
strategies to one platform area it might work also for other areas of the concept. While, the 
framework isn’t groundbreaking around e-marketplace platforms it is able to foster and support 
current thinking as well as create structure around the topic that benefits the community. Since e-
marketplaces are firmly covered in the literature, this has also helped and guided the work, helping 
to understand relevant topics and building structure to the work with regards of less established 
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SaaS and SNS. In addition, this thesis has expanded the typical discussions points from e-
marketplace platforms to include SaaS and SNS and taken stand on weather those are relevant and 
helpful also when researching the other platform types. 
Although it is evident that SaaS solution play a clear part in platform business (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2008; Cusumano, 2011b; Hagiu, 2014; Edelman, 2015) there isn’t much literature on 
how SaaS platform strategies ought to be managed. Rather the literature focuses on platform 
leadership or multisided platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Cusumano, 2011b; Hagiu, 2014; 
Edelman, 2015) or to discuss SaaS from a non-strategic angle (Focacci et al., 2003; Concha et al., 
2010; Bibi, Katsaros, & Bozanis, 2012; Lee, Park & Lim, 2013; Shuying, Shuai & Sun, 2013). The 
areas where these literatures overlap are rather limited. Thus, this thesis has been able to contribute 
a lot to this area. Offering a framework where SaaS business models have been divided into four 
strategies help the businesses to direct their resources into building meaningful efforts in making the 
platform succeed. The framework has especially increased the understanding of socially dependent 
SaaS as these have been previously very little understood. Similarly, the division between four sub-
categories of SaaS is unique for this thesis and has improved the understanding of SaaS 
significantly. Furthermore, as social factors are relevant in many platform models, this 12 point 
strategic division of the theoretical framework has helped to highlight what social factors play a 
crucial role in each platform type or weather social factors are insignificant to them. This has been a 
significant improvement to the whole platform discussion. Especially since authors like Hagiu and 
Spulber (2013) and Strowel and Vergote (2016) have simply grouped platforms, that create social 
value into one. Disregarding the fact, that these platforms might not have anything else in common.  
Consequently, one of the greatest values of this thesis might be directed into how to understand 
SNS. Since SNS literature doesn’t cover much of the SNS as being a platform business model 
(Cusumano, 2011a; Edelman, 2015) this thesis has advanced the idea on the topic by analyzing 
platform businesses as part of the platform phenomenon. As well as to define and separate unique 
features of SNS as well as to bring clarity on SNS strategies as previous literature has dependent on 
few cases on the matter. Especially the information driven side of SNS has not been discussed and 
even the people driven parts have been discussed as one. Meaning, that the four sub-categories of 
SNS within this theoretical framework is unique for this thesis and has improved the understanding 
of SNS significantly. More importantly, SNS hasn’t always been distinguished as a separate 
concept, worthy of being discussed on its own. Rather it has been covered as one with e-
marketplace or SaaS or under yet another definition or as undefined platform topic. Thus, it is high 
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time to show that SNS is worthy of its own discussion, the phenomenon is evident in business and 
academia should improve how the topic is captured and discussed in the future.  
Therefore, this thesis suggests that both SNS and SaaS should be treated as separate concepts. Thus, 
grouping SNS and SaaS as a single group is problematic as it tends to dismiss both, not recognizing 
their unique features while misleading the reader. Furthermore, it creates confusion and bad 
concepts within all platform literature if the theories over simplify all uniqueness into one category, 
something that has happened a lot in multisided platform literature. Instead of each platform type 
having a clear focus on themselves, many have been mixed together with e-marketplace type. If the 
aim is to produce precise and highly accurate knowledge, this kind of conceptual mixing cannot 
take place. Instead clear boundaries between the platform types need to be put in place and suitable 
terms to be utilized to discuss the matters. This is where this thesis builds value, as it has built clear 
boundaries, structures and both named and captured the unique features each platform type 
represents and how they act in the market. For the sake of good research and business decision 
making these three platform types and the 12 strategies they represent need to be separated and 
respected as similar, but different platform strategies. While the thesis doesn’t elaborate on all 
possible angles on each 12 strategies, they are well formed and the mere fact that those have been 
separated and identified is valuable on its own as it strengthens each concept and their standalone 
value to the field. Moreover, the insights of the higher level six strategies developed by the two-
layered theoretical framework are already meaningful and new on how both SNS and SaaS 
strategies can be meaningfully discussed and developed. Furthermore, this kind of separation of the 
three platform models as well as their 12 strategies within the improved three-layered theoretical 
framework will allow future researchers to go deeper into these individual concepts and strategies 
highlighting their unique features more accurately.  
5.3 Framework’s contribution to chicken or egg dilemma Just like many authors have suggested strategies for platforms on how to avoid a chicken-and-egg 
problem (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Hagiu, 2014; Parker, 
Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016), the suggested framework by this thesis is also contributing to that 
discussion. While the 12 strategies seek to offer specific focus points on what value to create and 
for what audience it also describes a more limited platform frame under which each platform should 
focus within. Thus, the framework provides both focus areas and limits where platforms should 
focus their efforts and resources towards.  
While the existing literature has been eager to hint how to avoid a chicken-and-egg problem (Brunn, 
Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002; Edelman, 2015; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016), the 
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suggestions offered have included little context around where, how and why something might work. 
Similarly, they have dismissed what other factors might be tied to the same concept as well as to 
illustrate how those decisions might influence the platform more conceptually. While the 
suggestions seem to be legitimate and reasonable, they provide little help to business decision 
makers while being loosely understood and tied to one another. Thus, the framework offered here 
adds a lot value both to academia and businesses as it ties the concepts more closely to one another 
and elaborates on where to focus depending on the platform type and business case. 
Although, opening the chicken-and-egg problem is valuable, the fact that it is done in wider context 
is the greatest addition this thesis provides to this discussion. Furthermore, the fact that the topic is 
discussed in platform level, instead of e-marketplace (Brunn, Jensen & Skovgaard, 2002), platform 
leadership (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Lee et al., 2010), multisided 
platform (Hagiu, 2014; Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016; Wan et al., 2017) or digital 
platform (Edelman, 2015) is new in itself. This more inclusive approach to the topic highlights the 
importance of gaining first users in all platform types and to help platform companies to identify 
themselves as platforms and further to think about the kind of platform model they belong to. As 
these weren’t self-evident factors with the interviewed companies nor with all of the 70 platforms 
tested as they didn’t necessarily identify themselves as a platform. Moreover, it seems that when 
there has been internal confusion about these matters, they have hindered the platform from 
realizing its full potential as resources have been allocated without a clear purpose and strategy. 
Thus, a strong advice by this thesis, is to choose a key target group and seek to satisfy this group’s 
needs before seeking to facilitate other needs. This will simplify the difficult decision-making 
equation. Simultaneously, this is likely to be more cost-efficient strategy. Hence this thesis argues, 
that although authors like Edelman (2015) and Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary (2016) have been 
suggesting, that chicken or egg dilemma is a great challenge for many platforms it seems to 
overcomplicate things. Afterall, the question should nearly be who is the key customer for the 
platform, rather than seeking to answer how to facilitate multisided market and who to onboard 
first? While the questions might look merely the same the former is much simpler than the latter. A 
shopping center’s main concern when attracting clients shouldn’t be how to attract businesses, 
consumers, maintenance supply, public transportation and other services. Rather they should be 
focused on how to attract businesses to their location. Once the businesses have been attracted 
consumers will follow that will further attract maintenance supply, public transportation and other 
services to the area. Similarly, platforms need to understand the business they are in and who is 
their key customer. A single group may drive none, few or many to join the platform as of 
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consequence. Thus, it is vital for businesses to understand where they belong and what social 
factors might play towards their platform. The thesis contributes to this by giving six clear options 
on who the key user might be while complimenting this information with 12 value offerings for 
their key consumer, two for each group. As well as discussing the social factor that is likely to 
influence people to join their platform. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS This section summarizes main findings discussed in the analysis and findings chapter. After which 
it discusses contributions of the thesis, limitations of this study and future research topics that could 
further improve the understanding of platform strategies. 
6.1 Main Findings The purpose of this study was to build clarity and identify platform businesses strategies. Thus, 
answering to the research question set for this study: what strategies platforms apply as they go in 
business and how they attempt to grow? In order to answer this, understanding of the following 
areas was first acquired 1) what platform strategies companies have adopted and 2) what might 
differentiate them from others? Consequently, the theoretical framework deriving from the analysis 
of this thesis proposes key components that form a platform strategy building a three-layered 
theoretical framework separating and suggesting 12 unique platform strategies for launch and 
multiple vertical and horizontal expansion strategies that can be applied for attracting further 
growth towards the platform. Thus, the theoretical framework of this thesis illustrates the answer 
towards the research question set for this study. 
Based on the findings of this study, it is clear, that companies adopt different platform strategies. 
While many of the strategies have clear similarities, they are also unique at a factor level. The 14 
interviews enabled identifying three main groupings of strategic decision forming three mutually 
exclusive platform types as e-marketplace, Software as a Service and Social Networking Sites. 
Thus, forming the base for the theoretical framework representing the key finding of this thesis. The 
platform type explains the high-level business model, that the groups represent and the key 
boundaries under which these platforms must operate in. These three groups were further split into 
six more specific categories explaining to greater detail the key target groups each model could 
follow forming a two-layered theoretical framework. As the new theory of six platform strategies 
were further tested with 70 existing platforms an even further layer of differentiating factors was 
discovered. Leading to a discovery of 12 unique platform strategies that further created boundaries 
and opportunities when pursuing one of the 12 value offerings strategies. This value offering 
strategy would be utilized when forming platform’s MVP at launch as well as to understand 
differences on how complimenting decisions might influence their platform strategy. These 
acknowledgements and guiding factors represent the improved three-layered theoretical framework 
created by this thesis. 
E-marketplace platforms focus on connecting supply and demand in an efficient way to make 
discovering, finding, comparing and trading both physical goods and services as simple and 
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enjoyable as possible. Thus, the companies emphasize succeeding to reinforce positive network 
effects and connectivity as means to bring the different parties together more cost efficiently and 
conveniently. Depending on the offering, marketplaces can be further divided into consumer- and 
business-driven models dependent on the key target group they serve. While the consumer driven e-
marketplace tends to focus on selling goods and services, that majority of population can supply and 
demand. In contrast the business driven focuses on more specialized goods and services or capital-
intensive businesses models, serving needs that most cannot supply. Both groups are further divided 
based on product- or service-based value offering to unveil the niche these companies tend to focus 
in their early days when creating an MVP. While e-marketplaces focused on service offering often 
have an advantage when they operate locally as they can meet with potential buyers, discuss details 
and often operate under the same cultural and linguistic frame making the customer often feel more 
secure. On the contrary, e-marketplaces focused on product offering often have an advantage when 
they operate globally as they tend to have an advantage over price and variety of offering. However, 
the cost related to globally operating e-marketplace can be more difficult to manage. On top of 
these strategic decisions a common complication these companies have faced is how to successfully 
build a user-friendly design, powerful search functions and other means for the user to find the most 
accurate option for them while putting the least effort in discovering it. Since the design is an 
integral part of how well value is enabled the platform owner tends to consider the entire user 
journey from searching to purchasing to delivering and follow-up. While this is true for all e-
marketplaces it is more so for product oriented once and perhaps even more essential for globally 
operating e-marketplaces.  
Software as a Service (SaaS) refers to a platform model, where the platform focuses on improving 
efficiency and automating back-office functions. These are often sold as a technical solution that 
modernized old ways of doing things, such as digitizing and automating functions through a cloud 
service. These enable easy access regardless of the user’s device and location, but also may provide 
access for multiple users simultaneously improving coworking possibilities and supporting virtual 
teams. Based on the social and networking effects SaaS was further split into socially dependent 
and independent key user target groups that determine how much the platform is enabled to benefit 
from positive network effects in user acquisition. When new users are socially dependent on others 
using the service, they are more likely to spread it through their own network. This leads to the last 
splitting factor of SaaS strategic decisions, being the value offered by an MVP. The MVP considers 
whether or not the user is dependent on his or her network being part of the SaaS or simply any user 
being connected to the network. The second stream of SaaS strategies follow independent pattern, 
91 
 
meaning that there is no link or a vague link among the popularity between the SaaS and the value 
experienced by its key users. The user needs to simply gain access and learn how to use the service. 
These tend to be more technology focused platforms. These are further divided into standard and 
personalized platforms value offered by an MVP. Personalized SaaS might be shaped prior delivery 
by the creator, or the service might learn the individual preferences of the user during usage 
changing the service based on the user’s needs. In comparison standard offerings appear always the 
same for all the customers and cannot create significant added value via personalized value offering 
to the customer.  
Social Networking Sites (SNS) refer to a platform model, where the platform focuses on building 
connectivity, networks and enabling innovative usage by the users. This platform type enhances 
individual contributions and connecting both people and things. The group is further divided into 
information and people driven SNS based on the key target group the SNS has. People driven 
networks grow from initial social group that others wish to connect to enabling positive network 
effects in user acquisition. These groups often evolve around established Social Networking Sites, 
local communities, events, hobbies or other interest groups. They can be further divided into SNS 
offering value to its users by connecting them with their current networks or alternatively seeking to 
expand the network of the user, thus being the MVP of the SNS. If the latter is the MVP the SNS 
might connect people based on their common interests along other factors. The alternative key 
target group for SNS is information driven. These SNS are built around information, knowledge 
and personal experiences. They can be further divided into two groups of primary- or secondary 
data being the value offering for the chosen target group. The primary-data is focused on personal 
experiences, opinions and views within a sociocultural context. The secondary-data is keener on 
knowledge and information paying little or no value for personal experiences when seeking 
satisfying knowledge. This focus on secondary data, means that information has value once it is 
aggregated. Thus, a single opinion is irrelevant in this SNS type while the value is created on 
representing consensus or average of the general population involved in the platform as well as their 
experiences and opinions when aggregated. Meaning that the value produced by this type of SNS 
becomes more valuable the more people engage with it and it benefits from the network effects. 
Among the three platform types Social Networking Sites is probably the most difficult when it 
comes to realizing its value, monetizing it and acquiring a cash flow it also has the most non-profits 
among all the three platform types. Consequently, many of these services rely on advertising 
income or monetizing on the more questionable manner by selling user’s information forward.  
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In terms of expansion strategy, the platform following a vertical expansion strategy seem to follow 
one of the 12 subcategories described above when creating their MVP at launch. Later, when 
companies choose to expand, they choose between vertical and horizontal expansion strategy. If the 
company chooses to enter new market by adopting horizontal expansion strategy, they keep the 
value offering the same while slightly varying with the key target group. Mainly meaning the 
location and possibly other sociocultural modifications and heavier marketing focus that might be 
associated with a market entry strategy. Whereas, if the company chooses to expand their offering 
by vertical expansion strategy, they are likely to expand their value offering for the same or similar 
target group. Thus, the company keeps its initial platform type as e-marketplace or SaaS or SNS as 
well as the MVP while it increases its value from ¼ areas to 2/4 areas within the value offering 
targeting everyone falling for their key target group instead of half of them. Meaning they start 
blending the initial focus into the closest subcategory representing instead of one of the 12 
categories one of the six. Meaning slight expansion of the initial strategy that they started with, but 
still very much aligned with it. As companies mature and extend their offering, they tend to stick 
with one of the six subcategories. Some successful companies expand even further, especially when 
they have resources or start facing maturity, they tend to start complimenting new platform that has 
the potential of growing their business further. When this happens, they start the strategic process 
all over again, seeking for new business opportunity to exploit with a new MVP and a new value 
offering based on the 12 strategic suggestions. Thus, they aren’t any longer limited to the same 
platform type they originally chose. Instead, they might grow into a completely new area as 
Facebook has done with its SNS focus and additional new platform within e-marketplace. 
Although, platforms mainly follow e-marketplace, Software as a Service or Social Networking Sites 
strategy, some of them try to cover areas from more than one. Companies that attempt this strategy 
are mainly incumbents that are involved in horizontal integration covering multiple industries and 
attempting simultaneously multiple platform projects and so follow more than one of the strategic 
categories. Yet, if each platform is treated as a single entity, incumbents should also benefit and 
utilize the framework discovered in this thesis and apply it for their benefit. A second group of 
potential dual- or multi-platform strategies are early phase startups that haven’t yet found a scalable 
business model but explore their options. The latter group tends to settle for a single platform 
strategy or alternatively seek growth with a dual-strategy balancing between resource split when 
seeking growth. If a startup keeps its dual-strategy before moving to growth it risks splitting focus 
and resources in too many attempts that might cause the business to fail. Therefore, it is encouraged 
do have a specific focus and select only one of the 12 strategies from the framework to follow. 
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Having a single strategy will improve startups potential to successfully tap into a market and 
uncover positive network effects and enable them to grow and scale fast enough. 
Lastly, it seems rather evident based on this study that it is possible to succeed as a platform 
business even with some bad luck, mistakes, pivots and early failures. Simultaneously, no matter 
how successful your business currently is, it might not lower your risk nor uncertainty level for 
future success. In fact, due to the fast-paced and volatile nature of the industry, platforms might be 
able to both fail and thrive in a shorter time loop than most other businesses. 
6.2 Contributions, limitations and future research  
The framework is radical and groundbreaking in the sense that there aren’t many who have 
attempted to map different platform types and their strategies in a mutually exclusive manner. 
Instead, they have provided rather wide, but scattered pieces of information with regards to one 
platform type being the most common scope. Whereas, only few have mapped platforms types and 
even then, with only little consistency and logic. Moreover, none of the previous papers have been 
able to be precise, extensive and mutually exclusive in their platform type groupings. Furthermore, 
none of the papers concerned about strategy have been able to give clear indications of which 
models to use in combination with each other leaving the business owner with multiple decisions at 
hand, but no guideline to follow. This is the single biggest flaw in current strategy literature 
amongst platforms as they lack concreate and holistic strategic help towards the business decision 
making. Thus, this thesis is extremely valuable to both academia as well as businesses, as it builds a 
rather wide and holistic theoretical framework through which platform businesses can be viewed 
and discussed in the future. Therefore, the framework itself suggests multiple interesting study areas 
for the future wheatear the focus would be on understanding on of the platform strategies of e-
marketplace, Software as a Service or Social Networking Sites or their 12 subcategories, the 70 
companies categorized or perhaps the link between maturity and the strategic decisions made later 
in the platform life cycle.  
While the theoretical framework of this thesis is unique, the structure and understanding it creates 
around platform types and their strategies is significant. Furthermore, the way different factors have 
been discussed and included to the framework creates an extremely valuable insight as it makes the 
framework relevant to most papers of the field, tying majority of the past platform literature more 
closely to one another. Thus, increasing most papers value and relevance to the rest of the field as 
now their detailed discussion topics are linked to the bigger discussion and bigger variety of 
platform types instead of the narrower original focus these papers had. This holistic approach of the 
paper has been much needed as it brings unity and context to the multiple papers within the field. 
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While many authors have discussed few factors, those have only been loosely connected to the 
platform type or strategy. Hence, there is a lot of knowledge around single factors and how to 
enable or benefit from it, but most of the knowledge is scattered and inconclusive for business 
decision making. Meaning, that there is an opportunity to further organize past literature to form 
even more rounded, holistic and significant conclusions on how each factor might behave in a 
different platform type and its strategy. Alternatively, a multi case study focusing on a single 
platform type and their different strategic variations across the life cycle would be a preferable 
method to confirm which factors are in fact the most important once given the target focus group 
and MVP of each platform. Once the factors are better understood in relation of the platform and 
each strategy a quantitative method could test and confirm whether the main body of literature 
based upon qualitative case studies has been able to accurately model the platform reality. 
Although, the framework supports and further structures the existing knowledge around e-
marketplace model and its strategy it also shapes academic discussion towards a more rounded and 
comprehensive understanding of this area. While it seems that the basic understanding of e-
marketplace platforms has matured especially in relative terms when compared towards any other 
platform type thus suggesting that the focus of the field can either be directed towards a more in-
depth strategic factor analysis of e-marketplaces or creating and enhancing understanding of other 
platform strategy types that have remained nearly untapped. Consequently, this theoretical 
framework is ground breaking for the current understanding of both SaaS and SNS platform models 
and strategies bringing the level of understanding of these concepts towards the level they deserve. 
As both platform types have been looked upon and their significance to the whole platform 
discussion forgotten or ignored in most studies. This means that the strategic understanding of these 
two concepts are yet forming and researchers can rather easily find new venues to contribute in 
while creating bigger impact though their findings for both academia and businesses in the field. 
While this thesis has put on effort to find most popular terms to discuss the topic, it has been done 
because of the inconsistent and varying terminologies utilized in the field. Meaning that consensus 
is yet to be reached to settle common terms. Thus, this thesis encourages others to utilize these same 
terms in order to bring consistency and to move the discussion from words to meaning and stabilize 
the field. However, studying past studies before conducting own research isn’t without a 
compromise although expected. While the accumulated knowledge helps to increase relevance and 
significance of the research it can also restrict and hinder the creative conclusions otherwise 
possibly drawn from the analysis. Given this, the past papers studied prior conducting the study 
might have guided the thinking and the suggestions made based on the findings. As the theoretical 
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framework is derived from companies operating in the field, it also follows the key ideas found 
from the literature. Although the latter might be coincidence it can also be unintentionally done and 
misleading. Suggesting, that the sample could have resulted towards different conclusions drawn 
from them if the researcher’s knowledge of the platform studies had been smaller. Thus, the 
resemblance between major studies and the framework suggested by this thesis can mean multiple 
thing. Just like the similarities between independent papers can mean that maturity is about to be 
reached among some areas like identifying some key factors of platforms as well as e-marketplace 
platform concept. However, it can also mean researchers inability to question and invalidate past 
conclusions or the difficulty they face when seeking to do so. If the theoretical framework of this 
paper is flawed in this manner, it is most likely evident within e-marketplace area of the framework.  
For businesses, this research provides a theoretical framework that can be applied to estimate one’s 
own platform strategy or utilizing it when creating a new platform to have a strategic guide to 
follow. This framework might also help to understand the competition, different players and their 
strategic advantages and vulnerabilities better. Most of all, this brings transparency and clarity to 
the industry that is comparatively young regardless of the fact, that there are companies that have 
operated for few decades successfully. For startups, this might bring focus and structure on 
understanding basic principles on what concepts belong together and how these forces are 
intertwined like in the case of network effects and growing the platform and being able to monetize 
it. With regard of platform companies, this paper might help them to weight different options on 
how and from where to seek growth from, between expanding offering or supporting wider 
geographical area.  
While, the theoretical framework is derived from companies operating in the field, the sample size 
might have limited or skewed the results. Since, the sample size of 14 cases was used to generate 
the two-layered theoretical framework a bigger sample with bigger internal variations could have 
resulted towards a different framework. While the additional sample of 70 platforms did build a 
new third layer to the theory an addition of 200 platforms might have built even more complexity to 
the framework. While the framework does capture well Western platform realities it dismisses both 
the Global South and Oceania completely while having a very limited coverage of any Eastern 
platforms in the sample. Thus, the sample doesn’t capture all market realities and leaves the reader 
wonder if the theoretical model is universally applicable. While, the markets covered is a concern, a 
greater sample could uncover even more. Hence, generating new research on locally or globally 
operating platform types could foster, expand or invalidate the points made about the 12 platform 
strategies and their similarities and differences. Thus, illustrating a venue for further research on 
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each platform type to discover how the strategic decisions vary between a local and global market 
player.  
When the two-layered theoretical framework of six platform strategies was tested by allocating 70 
companies to one of the six clusters. The test could have ended differently if two different 
researchers had done independently the test or the framework. Similarly, if the starting point had 
been to cluster 70 companies from platform field, the frame could have been different. Interestingly, 
past two studies that had this starting point for platform clustering, were only partially in line with 
the three-layered theoretical framework this thesis created while arguing for the invalidation of the 
two past studies. Moreover, as the analysis of 70 companies was heavily based upon the 
researcher’s own user experience of each platform, the analysis could have been more insightful, if 
people working for these companies had been interviewed or utilized for the analysis. Thus, 
opening yet another alternative for future research area to understand platform strategies more fully. 
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8. APPENDIX Appendix 1, Message used to contact potential interviewees and translations of them 
 
Private message: Hei __________, Kirjoitan mun gradua alustataloudesta ja haluaisin kovasti haastatella sua aiheesta __________ edustajana. Haluaisin erityisesti kuulla teidän kokemuksista ja opeista matkalta. Oisko sulla mahdollisesti tunti aikaa esim ensviikolla haastattelulle?    Tutkimuksen tulokset on anonyymejä ja voin mieluusti lähettää sulle gradun sen valmistuttua alkuvuodesta 2019 sekä haastattelukysymykset ennakkoon.  Translated private message:  Hi (first name of the receiver),  
I’m writing my thesis about platform businesses and I’d like to interview you about it as (name of the company represented) representative. I’d especially love to hear about your experiences and learnings along the journey. Would you have an hour during next week for this interview?    The results of the analysis will be anonymous, and I could send you the final Thesis after it’s finished in 2019. I can also send you the interview questions prior the interview.   Email: Hei __________, Kirjoitan mun gradua alustataloudesta Aalto-yliopistolle ja haluaisin kovasti haastatella sua aiheesta __________ edustajana. Haluaisin erityisesti kuulla teidän kokemuksista ja opeista matkalta. Oisko sulla mahdollisesti tunti aikaa esim ensviikolla haastattelulle?  Tutkimuksen tulokset on anonyymejä ja voin mieluusti lähettää sulle gradun sen valmistuttua alkuvuodesta 2019 sekä haastattelukysymykset ennakkoon. Terveisin,  Sanni Siipilehto  Translated email:  Hello (first name of the receiver),  
I’m writing my thesis about platform businesses in Aalto University and I’d like to interview you about it as (name of the company represented) representative. I’d especially enjoy hearing about your experiences and learnings along the journey. Do you happen to have an hour next week for conducting this interview?  The results of the analysis will be anonymous, and I could send you the final Thesis after it has been finished in early 2019. I can also send you the interview questions prior the interview. Sincerely,  Sanni Siipilehto   
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Appendix 2, Interview guide 
 Interview guide for Finnish platform businesses  Thank you for taking the time to meet and do this interview. My name is Sanni Siipilehto and I am from Aalto University conducting interviews on platform businesses. This interview is being recorded for academic purposes and analysis, but the results will be anonymous. If it’s ok, I’d like 
to conduct this interview in English to mitigate potential misinterpretations of the data. I’d like to confirm our schedule? Do we have 60 minutes for conducting this interview?  Background:  1) Could you briefly tell what you do in the organization and when did you join the company?  Business model: 2) Can you explain your organizations business model and how it works?  a. Offering and value proposition, customers and users, monetization model? 3) Has the business model changed over time? If yes, how and why? 4) How do you measure and follow up on how your businesses is doing? What KPIs you use? 5) How do you compare to your competitors in the market currently?    Understanding the platform:  6) Do platform businesses differentiate themselves form other kind of businesses? How? 7) Could you shortly describe what information and resources you share on your platform (internally, within your supply chain, within your 3rd party network or industry)? 8) Does the company facilitate innovation? How does it do it?  9) Does the company facilitate network effects? How does it do it? 10) Does the company improve efficiency? How does it do it? 11) Does the company attract complementaries? How does it do it? 12) Does the company enable connectivity? How does it do it?  Business life cycle:  13) Has your business broken even? If, when did it happen or when do you estimate it to happen? 14) Could you describe the current state and maturity of the business? 15) What business priorities do you have? Have these priorities changed along the journey and if, how?  16) What have you learned along the journey? 17) What kind of future prospects do you see for your company or industry?  Other comments:  18) Is there something else you would like to discuss?  
